Reduced VAT for environmentally friendly products by Copenhagen Economics
 DG  TAXUD   
 
 
REDUCED VAT FOR ENVIRONMEN-
TALLY FRIENDLY PRODUCTS 





Authors:  Project leader Mr. Sigurd Næss-Schmidt, Ph.D. Svend Torp Jespersen, Ph.D. 
Lars B. Termansen, Mr. Marcin Winiarczyk and Mr. Jonatan Tops 
Partner and business manager Mr. Christian Jervelund has provided input on 
Quality Assurance 
Client:  DG TAXUD 
Date:  Friday, 19 December 2008 
ISBN:  - 
Contact:  SANKT ANNÆ PLADS 13, 2nd FLOOR | DK-1250  COPENHAGEN
PHONE: +45 7027 0740 | FAX: +45 7027 0741 





Chapter 1  Summary of Findings................................................................................9 
1.1.  Removing reduced VAT rates on energy consumption.........................................10 
1.2.  Reduced VAT rates for energy efficient products.................................................12 
1.3.  Question 1: Will lower VAT rates reduce energy consumption?...........................13 
1.4.  Question 2: Will lower VAT rates be cost effective in practice?............................18 
1.5.  Question 3: Will lower VAT rates distort Internal markets..................................27 
1.6.  Overall assessment...............................................................................................28 
Chapter 2  Cost Effectiveness in Reaching Environmental Objectives......................31 
2.1.  Why is root taxation cost effective in reducing GHG emissions?..........................31 
2.2.  Motivation for suplementary measures ................................................................32 
2.3.  Labelling, minimum standards, promotion of the best performers .......................40 
2.4.  VAT rate reduction versus alternative subsidies....................................................42 
2.5.  Political economy problems with VAT and other subsidies..................................47 
2.6.  Problems with increasing demand – rebound effects............................................49 
Case study:  VAT rates on pesticides, fertilisers and organic food....................................56 
Chapter 3  Overall results on energy consumption and public finances...................61 
3.1.  Scenarios for VAT rate changes and model used..................................................61 
3.2.  Scenario 1: Standard rates on heating and electricity............................................64 
3.3.  Scenario 2: Reduced rates on energy efficent energy using products.....................68 
Chapter 4  Effects on the Internal Market and Business Innovation........................77 
4.1.  Innovation framework: what set of incentives is best?...........................................77 
4.2.  Trade offs between Mandatory/voluntary rate reductions ....................................79 
4.3.  Substantial risk of cross border trade with voluntary policy..................................80 
References.....................................................................................................................87 
Appendix A:  Calculation of VAT rates for scenarios ..................................................102 
Appendix B   Data sources and issues..........................................................................105 
Consumption dataset...................................................................................................105 
VAT dataset.................................................................................................................107 
Product efficiency dataset.............................................................................................107 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
 
  4
In July 2007, the Commission presented a Communication on the effects of differentiated 
VAT rates to the Council and the European Parliament based upon a study from Copenha-
gen Economics. 
 
The study focussed primarily on the effect of differentiated VAT on labour intensive ser-
vices. Since then, the debate has spread to environmentally friendly goods. Some Member 
States have asked for the possibility to apply reduced rates to the supply of environmentally 
friendly goods, not the least to energy efficient consumer appliances.  
 
Coherence suggests that the current application of reduced rates in areas that may have an 
adverse impact on the environment, notably by encouraging energy consumption, should be 
reviewed at the same time. 
 
The focus of the current report is then on the potential use of reduced VAT on environmen-
tally friendly goods and the current application of reduced VAT on energy consumption by 
households. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of placing our findings in the con-
text of EU’s policy approach to climate change and energy security, including interaction 
with other policy instruments at the EU and national levels. 
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This report focuses on the role that differentiated VAT rates can play relative to two central 
policy objectives that have gained significantly in importance in the most recent years. 
 
The first policy objective is about reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) while at 
the same time reaching goals of energy security within the EU; both of which requires reduc-
tions in energy consumption. Should this policy objective be encouraged by way of reduced 
VAT rates on energy efficient consumer goods? For instance, Member States could encour-
age consumers to buy a freezer with low electricity consumption relative to other more elec-
tricity consuming freezers through a lower purchase price due to a lower VAT rate. 
 
The second policy objective is about distributional concerns and the competitiveness of frag-
ile industries. Rising global energy prices may adversely impact low income families and en-
ergy intensive industries as both spend a relatively large share of their budget on fuels and 
heating. Should this policy objective be encouraged by way of reduced VAT rates on energy 
consumption? For instance, Member States could shield low income families from the effect 
of higher energy prices by way of reduced VAT rates on the consumption of heating as it is 
in fact common in many EU countries. 
 
Our main conclusions concerning the first policy objective are: 
 
Generally, we believe that the best approach to reducing GHG emissions is to tax at root. 
Putting a proper price on the emissions of, for example CO2 emissions and thereby also en-
ergy use, will give consumers and industries incentives to reduce them. The EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) is a prime example of this; indeed emissions of CO2 from nearly all 
electricity consumption and district heating by households are already covered by the ETS. 
So any new measures encouraging lower electricity use by households will lead to a lower 
price of ETS emission allowances but will leave the level of CO2 emissions unchanged: the 
level of emissions is determined exclusively by the number of allowances allocated.  
 
Consequently, the real question here is whether supplementary action such as providing sub-
sidies to the most energy efficient variant of a specific product is able to reduce the cost of 
CO2 abatement beyond what the EU ETS offers. Promotion of energy efficient product 
variants should be about lowering the costs of meeting climate and energy policy targets by 
pushing consumers in the direction of “low hanging fruits”. By this is meant savings that 
have lower abatement cost than the price of ETS allowances, or outside the ETS sector, the 
level of appropriate national tax rates. If the answer is “yes”, then the EU can promote sup-
plementary action and in turn set higher ambitions in terms of future reductions of GHG 
and energy savings.  
 
Clearly, it is essential that consumers are provided with accurate information about how 
much energy different variants of the same product, for example freezers, consume. This al-
lows them to save money and energy by choosing the most energy efficient product. The EU 
Commission launched a major programme in July 2008 to encourage more widespread and 
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improved energy labelling of products, thus allowing consumers to choose the products with 
the lowest overall costs during the lifetime of the product. Consumers are, in many coun-
tries, also encouraged to carry out so-called “energy audits” to identify how to save energy 
cost-effectively. 
 
However, even with improved labelling in place, consumers may in practice be reluctant to 
switch to more energy efficient products even if such products save them money. The price 
of energy using products may be so low – for example light bulbs – that consumers are not 
really focused on the energy costs associated with the use of the product when buying it. 
This situation may call for either minimum efficiency standards to remove the “worst” per-
forming (inefficient) products from the market and potentially a subsidy such as a reduced 
VAT rate to promote the “best” performers (efficient). Furthermore, some products may ac-
tually be so expensive that cash-constrained households choose the less expensive but more 
energy consuming variant. In both cases, the idea is to reduce the upfront purchase price 
rather than letting price incentives work through lower user costs during the life time of the 
product. 
 
We provide three main conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of using reduced VAT 
rates to encourage consumers to save energy.  
 
First, it is not clear if energy savings will unambiguously follow from such purchase rewards. 
Products, such as household electrical appliances, consumer electronics and boilers for do-
mestic heating constitute only about 3 per cent of total consumption, but account at the 
same time for nearly 60 per cent of all energy consumption from households. So yes, energy 
efficient refrigerators will gain market shares from non-efficient, but at the same time more 
and larger freezers may be bought as these products falls significantly in price. This will shift 
overall consumption towards products that are very energy intensive in use.
1 For example, 
spending €100 on the purchase of even a very energy efficient air conditioner will lead to 
more energy use than spending €100 on furniture. In fact, our modelling results suggest that 
net effects on energy consumption are highly depending on both how the VAT subsidy is 
calibrated in terms of product coverage, energy efficiency requirements, as well country spe-
cific circumstances. The results should be read with caution: they are depending on a num-
ber of price reactions to changes in relative prices, and there limited consensus on their size. 
This suggests that any subsidy scheme would need to be well designed simply to achieve a 
decrease in energy consumption and that such schemes need to reflect national circum-
stances.  
 
Second, a lower VAT rate is a crude subsidy and may also lead to compliance problems in 
the real world. These problems could most likely be reduced or eliminated by using alterna-
tive measures that provide more targeted incentives as regards consumers’ purchase deci-
                                                           
1 By “energy intensive” we mean a high amount of energy associated with the production and use of the good or 
service over its lifetime relative to the price of the product.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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sions. For instance, rather than offering a VAT rate cut to all boilers/freezers that are classi-
fied as being energy efficient, consumers could be offered a fixed amount in monetary terms. 
Price premiums for energy efficient products not only reflect more energy efficiency, but of-
ten also more luxurious standards in other product characteristic which hardly deserve a sub-
sidy.  
 
Third, a lot of the products considered for being covered by lower VAT rates, such as freez-
ers, have “cross-border trade potential” because they are relatively expensive. Consumers may 
purchase the product in other countries in order to exploit lower price. Since the differences 
in price would be due to the VAT rates rather than ability to sell products more cost effec-
tively, this would advocate against a system of voluntary lower VAT rates, if “cross-border” 
groups are included. The effect could be overcome if member states use a subsidy scheme re-
quiring the consumer to be a resident. This will be an important point if reductions of VAT 
rates are optional rather than mandatory. 
 
All in all, we are sceptical about the merits of reduced VAT rates on energy efficient prod-
ucts. First, there are simply too many conflicting constraints in designing a package that 
should both help individual member states reach their climate and energy objectives while at 
the same time be consistent with internal market objectives. Second, fixed amount subsidies 
can be targeted better while avoiding internal market problems. Thirdly, as stated above, na-
tional residence based subsidy schemes can overcome the internal market problem. 
 
Our main conclusions on the second policy objective of distributional concerns are: 
 
First, the most cost-effective and focused way of addressing any adverse distributional im-
pacts caused by higher energy and food prices – whether from global forces or as a result of 
climate policies – is by way of social policies providing targeted subsidies to low income 
families. 
 
Second, by increasing the incentive to buy fuels through the current use of a reduced VAT 
rate on heating and electricity in several countries, policy makers are forced to provide 
stronger incentives elsewhere in the economy to meet CO2 and energy savings targets. This 
may equally harm low income families. For example, a reduced VAT rate on district heating 
in one country will lead to an expansion of demand for energy within the EU ETS, leading 
to higher energy prices for other consumers. Other consumers include low income families 
in other countries, as well as energy intensive industries exposed to external competition. 
 
Third, reduced VAT rates on energy consumption leads to transfers to oil producing coun-
tries. With the EU being still a main, though declining, player in the global energy markets, 
reduced VAT rates on energy consumption have lead to slightly higher energy prices from 
slightly higher EU energy demand, raising the EU’s import bill for oil and gas. This may 
harm low income families. Furthermore, it is a bad signal to send to the global community 
which currently is moving in the direction of unwinding substantial subsidies to energy con-  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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sumption (Asia, Middle East and Latin America) or wavering in the resolve to maintain cur-
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The EU has declared the objectives of combating global climate change and improving en-
ergy security as prime objectives for energy policies. For this purpose, the EU has committed 
itself to reduce GHG emissions by 20 per cent between 1990 and 2020; even 30 per cent if a 
strong global agreement can be reached at the climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009. 
More or less at the same time, more attention has been devoted to the geopolitical risks asso-
ciated with imports of oil and gas from potentially unstable regions. This has been a key ar-
gument to set a target for reducing energy use by 20 per cent over the same period as well as 
expanding the share of renewable energy to 20 per cent. 
 
The implications of these objectives are clear. The EU needs to promote energy savings both 
to reduce GHG emissions and to reduce import dependency. But at the same time, expand 
renewable energy, partly because relying too much on energy savings may imply too high 
energy prices. This is the so-called affordability argument. 
 
For this reason, the EU has put in place a comprehensive international cap-and-trade system 
to reduce greenhouse gases in a cost-effective way, namely the Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS). It covers nearly all electricity and district heating produced as well as some industrial 
CO2 emissions and non-CO2 greenhouse gases.  At the same time, Member States are to an 
increasing extent using their tax system to complement the ETS in the sectors outside the 
ETS, such as individual heating and road transportation. In addition, a number of other, 
more regulatory policy measures are being introduced at the EU and national level.  
 
The core of this study is what role – if any – should VAT rate policy play in underpinning 
these objectives. We look at two specific options. 
 
First, a number of countries have currently reduced VAT rates on energy consumption of 
households.  This raises a potential trade-off problem between two competing policy objec-
tives:  
 
On the one hand, this may mitigate the effect of higher global energy prices which tend to 
fall harder on low income families’ budgets. Indeed, some countries have specifically used 
this argument to argue for extension of low rates also to fuel taxes for cars and not only to 
lower rates on heating and electricity.  
 
On the other hand, it is in the interest of the EU and other net importers of fossil fuels that 
taxes do more of the work to keep global energy prices from rising too much. Not only is 
energy taxation a cost-effective solution to abate CO2 emissions, but it also produces terms-
of-trade gains. With lower oil, gas and coal prices less consumer wealth is being transferred 
to the Middle East, Russia etc.  
 
We, therefore, examine as our number one VAT rate policy option a scenario where all pre-
sent VAT reductions on the use of heating and electricity are removed and replaced by the 
Chapter 1  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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standard rate. What are the effects on energy consumption and income distribution; how 
can adverse effects on the latter be mitigated? 
 
Second, some countries have proposed that the purchase of the efficient variants of energy 
using goods should be allowed reduced VAT rates. This is not currently allowed by the VAT 
directive. The purpose is to encourage energy savings in line with the key objectives of the 
EU’s climate and energy policies. 
 
We, therefore, examine as our number two VAT rate policy option scenarios with either 
voluntary or mandatory reductions of VAT rates on energy using products. We estimate net 
effects on energy consumption and review the proposals also on the basis of cost-
effectiveness and internal market concerns. 
1.1.  REMOVING REDUCED VAT RATES ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
The study has first looked at a scenario where all present reductions of VAT on energy con-
sumption are removed. At present, seven countries have reduced rates on both electricity and 
heating in households, six countries only have reduced VAT rates on heating and one coun-
try only has reduced the VAT rate on electricity. Replacing the reduced rates with standard 
rates – which can be lowered marginally due to higher revenues – leads to effective increases 
in VAT rates on heating and electricity of 3 to 4 percentage points in EU cf. Table 1.1. It 
will at the same time bring in new revenues.  
  
Table 1.1 Electricity and heating: VAT rates and energy consumption, 2008 
Present average reduction in 
VAT, percentage points 









gain, per cent 
of GDP 
A: lower rate on heating  19.4  2.5  -  -0.8  0.01 
B: lower rate on electricity  18.0  -  13.0  -  - 
C: lower rate on electricity and heating  18.6  9.8  11.0  -1.4  0.08 
D: no reductions  20.4  -  -  0.0  0 
EU average  19.5  3.8  3.3  -0.8  0.03 
Note: Country group A encompasses Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany and Hungary. Group B contains 
Malta. Group C encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, and United Kingdom. 
Group D contains the remaining EU27. No effects are estimated for Malta due to lack of data. The results 
have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 
3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
Without taking into account the workings of the ETS covering electricity and district heat-
ing, energy consumption should fall by nearly 1 per cent in total; somewhat more for the 
countries presently with reduced rates. Revenue gains as share of GDP will range from 0 in 
the countries with no present reductions up to nearly 0.2 per cent of GDP in the countries 




The removal of reduced VAT rates for heating and electricity will have some adverse impact 
on the income distribution. The households in the bottom 20 per cent of the income scale 
spend nearly 5 per cent of their disposable income on electricity and heating expenditures 
versus 3 per cent for households in the top 20 end.  Put differently, first quintile families al-
locate over 50 per cent more of their total spending to these goods than do fifth quintile 
families (relative spending shares over 150 per cent). This stands in sharp contrast to spend-
ing on transport fuels, largely for cars, where high income families allocate a relatively larger 
share cf. Table 1.2. So, reduced VAT rates on heating/electricity have quite different distri-
butional effects as compared to reduced VAT rates on gasoline and diesel.  
  














tile, per  cent
District  heating  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 150 
Electricity 2.1  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.4  157 
Gas 1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.6  167 
Heating oil  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  173 
Solid fuel  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2  161 
Transport fuel  2.1  2.9  3.3  3.6  3.3  65 
Total energy, excl.   
transport fuel  4.8 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.0  161.6 
Note: Per cent of total household consumption expenditure. COICOP structure of household expenditure, 2005. 
Czech Republic excluded due to lack of data. Quintile 1 is the lowest income; Quintile 5 is the highest in-
come. Countries are weighted by size of final household consumption expenditure.  
Source: Eurostat (2008) and Copenhagen Economics.  
 
If revenues are recycled by way of a reduced standard VAT rate, the net increase in costs of 
consumption for the bottom 20 per cent will be 0.04 per cent. At the same time, the richest 
20 per cent will face a reduction in cost of the same order cf. Table 1.3. For median income 
groups, net effects on disposable income will be insignificant. 
   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 1.3 Net impact on consumer prices across households: abolition of reduced rates 
of VAT on heating/electricity financed by lower standard rate 
Income quintile 
Country group  Quintile1 
(lowest income)




A   0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.03 
B  - - - - - 
C  0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 
D  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU 27 average, 
(unweighted)  0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01  -0.05 
Note:  For each country group we calculate the difference in the percentage change in COICOP consumption ex-
penditure between the poorest and richest income quintile households. Czech Republic is excluded due to 
lack of data. Country group A encompasses Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany and Hungary. 
Group B contains Malta. Group C encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, and 
United Kingdom. Group D contains the remaining EU27. The values are to be interpreted as the percent-
age change in consumption expenditure under a given scenario relative to the baseline. A positive value in-
dicates an increase in consumption expenditures relative to baseline. No effects are estimated for Malta due 
to lack of data.  
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
As the reduced rates are in most cases motivated by income distribution concerns, the logic 
would be to recycle an appropriate part to the same groups. The most general and least dis-
torting mechanism would be through social policy instruments (higher unemployment bene-
fits, public pensions) and tax policy instruments (thresholds for paying social security contri-
butions, income taxes etc). More targeted but potentially also more distorting are higher di-
rect subsidies linked to the size of energy bills for low income families. It will in practice be 
difficult to construct such schemes that do not at the margin provide a net subsidy to energy 
consumption.  
 
The recommendation for the EU is thus to move in the direction of abolishing the reduced 
rates on heating and electricity while leaving it to Member States to find the proper mecha-
nisms in the social and general tax arsenal to compensate for adverse effects on the income 
distribution. 
1.2.  REDUCED VAT RATES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENT PRODUCTS 
The basic idea of reduced VAT rates for energy efficient products is pretty simple. The con-
sumer is faced with two versions of the same product, e.g. one version of a freezer consuming 
a lot of energy and a second version of a freezer consuming less energy. If we could get more 
consumers to buy energy efficient variants, then the EU could reduce energy use. The idea is 
then to reduce prices on products with certified higher standards of energy efficiency by 
charging lower VAT rates. It is expected that this will lead to market shares being shifted in 
favour of the less energy consuming variant. 
 
We evaluate this idea focusing on three questions: 
   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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  Will lower VAT rates reduce energy consumption?  
  Will lower VAT rates be a cost-effective mechanism in practice? 
  Will lower VAT rates be compatible with internal market objectives? 
 
We answer these questions in the next three subchapters, respectively. 
1.3.  QUESTION 1: WILL LOWER VAT RATES REDUCE ENERGY CONSUMPTION? 
The basic idea of lowered VAT rates contains a carrot but no stick; this gives uncertain a 
priori effects on energy consumption. We do move market shares in the direction of energy 
efficient variants but we also reduce the price of products with high energy intensity, push-
ing other private consumption in that direction. Indeed the group of products to potentially 
benefit from reduced rates on energy efficient variants – household appliances, consumer 
electronics and domestic boilers – account only for 2.9 per cent of total private consump-
tion
2 but 56 per cent of the total direct and indirect energy use of households. 
 
So which effect is the dominant one? 
 
  Gains of market shares of efficient relative to inefficient freezers, etc. (the arrow 
pointing right in Figure 1.1) 
  ...or the increase in the purchase of freezers relative to other and less energy con-
suming household expenditure (arrow pointing upwards in Figure 1.1), the so-
called “rebound” effect? 
 
The rebound effect can take many forms such as switching into larger freezers or buying a 




                                                           
2 The data on household consumption expenditures on energy using products (household appliances, consumer 
electronics and boilers) is sourced from the GTAP6 database. Household appliances, consumer electronics and boil-
ers are durable goods. Consumption expenditures on durable goods in the GTAP6 are calculated using the national 
accounts methodology. Household consumption of durable goods is derived from the value of the sales of durable 
goods. Costs of installation, energy consumption or repair costs are not included. The cost of energy consumed by 
household appliances, consumer electronics and boilers is available separately.  
3 BIO (2009), p. 15, suggests that “increased presence of double or triple appliances in the same households, mainly 
TVs and refrigerators/freezers” is one of several factors explaining increased electricity consumption” in the EU. It 
suggests that consumer “saturation” with white goods does not stop when all households have one of each type of 
appliance.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of the rebound effect 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics, Bertoldi and Atanasiu (2007a), Eurostat. GTAP6. 
 
A priori, at least three specific products and country characteristics should determine the 
relative size of these effects:  
 
  How much more efficient is the energy efficient as opposed to the in-efficient 
product variant? 
  How large is the potential to expand the market share of the energy efficient vari-
ant? (If a country already is selling only energy efficient variants then not much can 
be gained.) 
  Generally how strongly do consumers react to changes in relative prices: (1) lower 
price of energy efficient variant to non-efficient variant and (2) lower price of en-
ergy consuming products relative to other products? 
 
The variation in penetration of energy efficient appliances across countries is also large. For 
high income countries such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, the share 
of energy efficient appliances as a whole is above 70 per cent. By contrast, it is below 50 per 
cent in Hungary and Malta and as low as 30 per cent in Bulgaria.  For domestic boilers al-
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Figure 1.2 Penetration of energy efficient appliances across countries 






























































































Source:  Copenhagen Economics, Bertoldi and Atanasiu (2007a), Kemna et al. (2007). 
 
Energy savings from reduced VAT rates on household appliances are, therefore, likely to be 
minor in the high income countries, for two reasons. First, there is little scope for further 
expansion. Second, the overall reduction of prices of efficient variants of energy using prod-
ucts relative to other products will be large, as the benefited group accounts for the bulk of 
products. This suggests that the rebound effect could be potentially large. 
 
To illustrate these effects with some ballpark estimates of net savings, we have set up an eco-
nomic model (explained in chapter 3). We then review a simple experiment: 
 
  All product variants belonging to the top classes A (A, A+, A++ ) are taxed at a re-
duced VAT rate of 5 per cent in all EU countries (other experiments are presented 
in chapter 3). 
  We finance the VAT loss by raising the standard VAT rate 
 
Table 1.4 A VAT scenario with reduced VAT rate on energy efficient products  
VAT rate, in per cent 
Product group 
Share of consumption  to-
day, per cent 
Today (average) 
Decrease with mandatory re-
duction 5 % VAT 
Household appliances  1.1  19.6  14.6 
Consumer electronics  1.1  19.6  14.6 
Boilers  0.7  19.6  14.6 
Source: EC (2008), GTAP and Copenhagen Economics. 
 
The results suggest that electricity consumption will go up while demand for fuels for heat-
ing will go down. This is hardly surprising: as shown in Figure 1.2 the share of energy effi-
cient variants of household appliances are already large in a large number of countries. This 
implies that the rebound effect will be very large: a large reduction in the overall price of ef-  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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ficient variants of household appliances and consumer electronics shifts a significant amount 
of overall private consumption towards highly energy intensive products. By contrast, pene-
tration of energy efficient boilers is much smaller. Chapter 3 provides more details on coun-
try groups.  Overall, some reduction of energy consumption may result from the experiment. 
 
Table 1.5 Change in energy consumption in per cent, EU27 average 
  Mandatory reduction 5% 
Fossil fuels for heating (non-district)  -1.91 
Electricity  0.48 
Total effect 
Change in total energy consumption in EU  -1.34 
Note: The results presented in this table relate to a scenario where VAT rates for energy efficient variants of house-
hold appliances, consumer electronics and boilers are reduced mandatorily in the EU to 5 per cent. The re-
sults have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, 
c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2008). 
 
Box 1.1 Rebound effects 
The rebound effect in these calculations tends to be larger than in standard literature on rebounding. This 
reflects first of all a fundamental difference in the experiment that we are looking at.  The traditional litera-
ture on rebounding considers the rebound effect of lower cost of energy due to technological progress. This 
study considers a change in the VAT rate on a specific group of energy consuming goods. 
 
In the traditional literature on rebound effects, the energy efficiency of energy consuming good is changed, 
reducing energy consumption, but also reducing the costs of using these goods. In traditional rebound lit-
erature, the size of the rebound effect is linked to the improvement in energy efficiency that reduced the 
running cost of using the product. The size of rebound effects in the literature is contested with a recent 
survey suggesting that they tend to be underestimated in policy evaluation. 
 
In this study, energy efficiency is improved by shifting consumers’ choice in the direction of more energy ef-
ficient variants of energy goods without changing the underlying energy efficiency of the variants. For this 
purpose a VAT change is introduced that directly affects the purchase price of the product leaving running 
costs unchanged. 
 
We underline that rebound effects in our experiment can be substantially higher than in the classical ex-
ample. This happen in particular when: 
  the market share of highly energy efficient variants is already large 
  the energy efficiency differential between efficient and non-efficient product variants is small 
 
In this case, we need a large decrease in the purchase price to obtain a given overall increase in the overall 
efficiency of purchased boilers, freezers, etc, while at the same time risking a substantial increase in the 
overall purchase of such products. 
Note:  See also Chapter 2. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
 
We have reviewed the sensitivity of the results with respect to three set of alternatives. First, 
we look at results if only the class A+ would benefit from reduced VAT rates for electrical 
appliances and not, as in the present version, all class A and better. This will lead to margin-
ally better results in terms of energy savings in countries such as Netherlands, while render-
ing effects near zero in countries where the penetration rates of A+ is miniscule cf. Table 1.6. 
Second, we look at the result of having either larger or smaller shifts from less energy effi-
cient towards more energy efficient products as a response to reduced VAT rates for the en-




If we restrict the use of reduced rates to energy using products rated A+ and A++ rather than 
all A rated products, then households electricity consumption in the Netherland is un-
changed rather than going up by ½ per cent cf. Table 1.6. Similar results hold for Spain. If 
we assume that consumers are reacting more aggressively in their shift towards energy effi-
cient variants – price elasticity of 4 rather than the benchmark rate of 3 – then household 
energy consumption falls by nearly 2 per cent rather than near 1 ½ per cent. 
 
Table 1.6 Sensitivity analysis of scenario 2 assumptions 
Analysis  Effect in percent 
Classes of household appliances, consumer electronics and 
boilers eligible for reduced VAT 
Effect on household electricity consumption in Netherlands 
A, A+ and A++  0.6 
A+ and A++  0.1 
  
Classes of household appliances, consumer electronics and 
boilers eligible for reduced VAT 
Effect on household electricity consumption in Spain 
A, A+ and A++  0.4 
A+ and A++  0.0 
  
Substitution elasticity between energy efficient and conven-
tional variants of household appliances, consumer electron-
ics and boilers 
Effect on household energy consumption in EU 
Elasticity = 2  -0.95 
Elasticity = 3  -1.34 
Elasticity = 4  -1.93 
Note:  Italicised text refers to main scenarios. The results have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ com-
putable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
 
A final sensitivity analysis concerns the degree of substitution between energy and non-
energy goods. If the substitution elasticity between energy and non-energy goods is set to for 
example 0.3 rather than the used 0.8, the rebound effect in scenario 2 can be reduced sig-
nificantly, cf. Chapter 3. However, assuming a lower rate of substitution between energy us-
ing goods and non-energy goods implies that scenario 1 will be less effective in reducing en-
ergy consumption, because higher prices on energy have less effect in the way of inducing a 
substitution away from energy goods. 
 
It is important to bear in mind, the restrictive assumptions involved in these results. The EU 
has introduced and will introduce further measures such as improved labelling and higher 
minimum standards for energy efficient products, to push consumers in the direction of en-
ergy efficient product variants. There is strong evidence that both higher energy prices and 
improved labelling significantly affects the energy efficiency of the energy using products on 
sale and the products being bought.
4 At the same time member states are considering com-
plimentary action including – for some countries – higher energy taxes on energy consump-
tion, particularly outside the ETS covered industries, such as individual heating. We have 
                                                           
4 Newell et al. (1998) in a study of energy products on sale in the US over the period from 1955 to 1995.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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not built in the effects of these policies: by definition this implies that the energy savings that 
can be reached by reduced VAT rates on energy efficient product variants are overestimated 
by orders of magnitude.  
1.4.  QUESTION 2: WILL LOWER VAT RATES BE COST EFFECTIVE IN PRACTICE? 
Irrespective of whether energy savings can be reached or not, the real issue is whether re-
duced VAT rates on energy efficient products is the most effective instrument. We look at 
this from three main angles: 
 
  Comparing with root taxation: can supplementary measures, including subsidies to 
energy efficient products, reduce abatement costs for consumers? 
  Are reduced VAT rates the most effective subsidy instrument in practice? 
  Public finance implications: revenue losses and distortions. 
 
Comparing with root taxation 
T a x ing  a n env ir o nm ent a l  pr o bl em  a t  r o o t  i s generally considered the most effective ap-
proach. If too much CO2 is emitted or energy consumed, tax CO2 or energy with the same 
amount irrespective of how and where it is used.  This provides equal incentives to save CO2 
or energy across the economy, pushing savings in the direction where they are the cheapest 
to reap. 
 
More indirect measures are less likely to ensure equal abatement costs across sectors and also 
tend to be cruder. It is, for example, difficult to ensure that the marginal cost of reducing 
energy use of freezers by way of reduced VAT rate on the energy efficient variant equals the 
marginal cost of reducing energy use from light bulbs by disallowing the least efficient vari-
ants.   
 
Indirect measures also tend to be crude in terms of ”targeting”. As discussed in chapter 4, 
countries are increasingly punishing gas guzzlers and rewarding cars which run many miles 
on a litre of gasoline by way of energy efficiency criteria being built into purchase and circu-
lation taxes. Such schemes will laudably push consumers in the direction of less consuming 
cars, but (1) they do not affect the drivers actual use of the car and (2) they are built upon 
relatively arbitrary measurement of fuels’ efficiency that do not take into account tyres used, 
whether the car is driving in the city or in rural area etc. 
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Taxing at root is precisely what the ETS does.
 5 In 2005, the EU introduced the ETS that set 
a total cap on CO2 emissions from the power sector, thus covering basically all electricity use 
and district heating. More stringent caps have ensured, and will in the coming years ensure, 
reductions in emission along with higher prices for allowances. The allowance price is cur-
rently just over €20 per ton for the 2008-2012 allocation period, and is expected by the EU 
Commission to rise to €39 per ton in the 20 per cent reduction scenario post 2012. It will 
also encourage energy savings by adding to electricity prices in the EU post 2012.  
 
Essentially all
6 electricity consumption by the household is covered by the ETS.  
 
What is outside the ETS in the context of this discussion is mainly heating of the households 
delivered by boilers installed in individual households and housing blocks. Presently, most 
member states impose tax rates on natural gas and mineral oils for heating purposes that are 
well below present price of ETS allowances and even further below the expected future price 
(measured as price per ton of CO2 emitted). As district heating –  in particularly in the form 
of co-generation with electricity – is one of the most energy efficient ways of delivering heat-
ing to households, this distortion in favour of domestic boilers clearly weakens incentives to 
overall energy efficiency. Further fiscal promotion of domestic boilers by way of reduced 
VAT rates, even if only on the most efficient ones, may further distort incentives in the heat-
ing market, discouraging the most energy efficient production. 
 
While ETS and national taxes, for example on heating oil and gas for boilers, are thus rec-
ommended as primary instrument to reduce CO2 emissions and energy consumption, we re-
view six arguments for additional policy action. Common for the six arguments is that con-
sumers for a number of reasons fail to capitalise on potential energy savings from buying en-
ergy efficient appliances that over the full life cycle of the product would actually save them 
money. The question to be addressed is what role subsidies to energy efficient products 
could play in this regard. 
 
First, consumers may fail to buy a product because there is inadequate information about 
size of savings. Such information failures call first of all for improved labelling and dissemi-
nation campaigns. Improved labelling – providing each product with information about en-
ergy use in “normal” circumstances – is precisely what the EU Commission has proposed to 
do, most recently in July 2008.
7 
 
                                                           
5 The differences between the ETS and a uniform and harmonised EU tax system covering the same industries be-
come smaller and more technical with the new proposal from the EU Commission from January 2008. In the ETS, 
the level of CO2 allowances and the allowances’ price will be determined, by supply and demand factors to ensure 
compliance with that target. If the EU were to meet the same reduction target by way of a tax it would need to re-
define the tax rate continuously to ensure target compliance. However, with the proposed full auctioning with pos-
sible exemptions for energy intensive industries in international competition, the system resembles in many aspects 
energy tax systems in countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark that operates with reduced energy tax rates 
for the same kind of industries. 
6 Small combustion installations are outside the ETS. 
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Second, energy savings may constitute only a fraction of the total cost of buying/using the 
product. That is for example the case for computers in households: they typically have a life-
span of 3-5 years and consumers are not likely to make the choice between a MAC, Dell or 
Lenovo computer depending on their energy use. So companies’ efforts to expand market 
shares by reducing for example standby power use may prove an investment with only lim-
ited financial return. This provides a potential case for “outlawing” computers which, for in-
stance, do not switch off energy use when not used. By contrast, reducing the VAT rate on a 
product costing €1,000 to save the consumer annual energy costs of perhaps €10 makes little 
sense.  
 
Third, sometimes the purchaser of the service/good is not paying the user cost. The classical 
example is construction of buildings, where the future tenants’ focus on running costs may 
have low priority in the developers overall aim to keep construction costs within a promised 
budget.  
 
We find that this so-called “principal agent problem” has some, but difficult to measure, 
relevance for the discussion of VAT rates in relation to energy efficient boilers. As allowed by 
VAT directives, member states can refrain from charging VAT on rented accommodation. 
This implies that landlords – professional or private – will benefit from a lower VAT rate on 
energy efficient inputs as incoming VAT on purchases cannot be deducted from an outgoing 
invoice where VAT is exempt. However, we are less convinced that we have a classical prin-
cipal-agent problem here with opposing interests. The buyer of the boiler and the landlord is 
one and the same person in contrast to the situation described above. At the same time, the 
(prospective) tenant may shop around for the best renting offer. If the landlord can bring 
down energy costs by buying a more efficient boiler, he/she should be able to attract tenants 
at conditions that are more attractive to both parties than if just staying with the inefficient 
boiler. We discuss some empirical evidence from the Netherlands in chapter 2 on this issue 
that we do not find entirely conclusive in terms of the significance of the principal-agent 
problem. 
 
Fourth, the consumer may find that it takes too much time, relative to the energy costs sav-
ings, to pick out the most energy efficient variant. Buying light bulbs in a supermarket may 
be a good example.  If consumers buy light bulbs in small quantities, rather than an entire 
year’s consumption, then they may refrain from seeking out the most efficient bulb down in 
the supermarket even if a slightly higher purchase price would be compensated by energy 
savings over the coming months/year.  A subsidy reducing the price of energy efficient prod-
uct may have a stronger effect on purchase behaviour than an attached label qualifying the 
product as energy efficient. 
 
Fifth, the up-front purchase costs of buying the energy efficient variant may prove a hurdle 
for cash-constrained households, even though households may recognise that there are long 
term savings. This may potentially be the case for some white goods as well as boilers: the 
price tag for energy efficient variants is in the range of €1,000-2,000 which is a sizable share   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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of a low income families yearly, let alone monthly, budget. The argument essentially hinges 
on poor and expensive borrowing conditions for such households with borrowing rates well 
above standard market rates.    
 
Sixth, consumers may be aware of the potential of net cost savings but fail to react on it be-
cause they tend to disregard future benefits relative to present up front costs. This argument 
is known as the myopia argument. Technically, this can be presented as future benefits being 
discounted at very high rates, well above market rates. While a lot of the literature focus on 
the myopia argument, the empirical evidence in support of it is not very strong. 
 
Some care should be taken to make a distinction between buying the product with the low-
est net costs when operating under certain conditions and the question of cost-effectiveness 
in a more general context. The simple fact that households are not buying the most energy 
efficient variant despite ample information available and no financial constraints is no proof 
of myopia: 
 
  He/she may use the product only rarely in which case it may in fact be cost effec-
tive to buy the cheapest version freezer, light bulb, boiler etc. for example for the 
summer cottage.  
  He/she may prefer the lighting quality going with a traditional light bulb rather 
than the efficient alternative.  
  He/she may postpone replacing the boiler even if it representing costs savings be-
cause it is not convenient right now. 
 
Arguments three, four, five and six provides possible justifications for providing subsidies 
that affects the purchase price rather than the running costs of energy using products to en-
courage higher efficiency.  
 
However, the costs savings that consumers can reach by moving towards efficient variants of 
energy using goods differ considerable. Using UK data, we find that efficient refrigerators 
save you 40 kWh per year but cost €91 more than the non-efficient variant cf. Table 1.7. By 
contrast, there seems to be a very little price premium for efficient washing machines, while 
relative energy savings are even higher.  For boilers the gains are very large.  
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Table 1.7 Average energy savings and price differences for white goods in UK, 2007 
Product  Energy consumption savings 
(kWh) per year 
Difference in price (€) 
Refrigerators 40  91 
Freezers 92  74 
Washing Machines  69  -7 
Dishwashers 57  52 
Ovens 41  134 
Domestic Lighting  50  2 
Domestic boilers  9, 000  400 
Note:  The savings are calculated as the difference between the weighted average energy consumption of products 
rated A and better and products rated B or worse. Difference in price is calculated as the weighted average 
price of energy efficient products minus weighted average price of energy inefficient products. For boilers 
the difference concerns standard boilers versus condensing boilers. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics; IVM (2008); Chalkley et al. (2001).   
 
Moreover, the marginal efficiency gains to be reached by moving up through the energy effi-
ciency classes (C to A++) are falling while price premiums are rising. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, choosing an A rated refrigerator instead of a B rated refrigerator would cost an 
additional €31 in purchase price, while it would save €70 worth of electricity.  But an A++ 
rated refrigerator compared to an A+ rated costs an additional €130 but only saves €45 
worth of electricity. Indeed, while moving from class B to class A+ leads to long term sav-
ings, moving from class A+ to A++ leads to higher user cost, cf. Figure 1.3. User costs are de-
fined here as up-front purchase price plus discounted value of future energy costs. Bear in 
mind that the example is from the Netherlands where consumers pay taxes on electricity well 
above the expected value of CO2 allowances. This already provides a very strong private re-
turn on energy savings. A similar pattern appears in the UK; however the shift from a B 
rated to an A rated refrigerator does not lead to lower total user cost, cf. Figure 1.4. 
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BA A + A + +
Average price NL (€) Total energy cost Total user cost
Note:  Assumptions: Lifespan 11 years, energy price € 0,283 / kWh and discount rate 5% 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics, IVM (2008), www.energy.eu (2008), EC (2007c), NAHB/Bank of America 
Home Equity (2007). 
 











B A A+ A++
Average Price UK (€) Total energy cost UK (€) Total User cost UK (€)
Note:  Assumptions: Lifespan 11 years, energy price € 0,166 / kWh and discount rate 5% 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics, IVM (2008), www.energy.eu (2008), EC (2007c), NAHB/Bank of America 
Home Equity (2007). 
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Both of these observations have clear implications for policy design. First, equal subsidy rates 
across the white goods sector will have strongly different net benefits. Second, promotion of 
the present top energy performers may not be cost-effective.  
 
This conclusion provides a difficult policy trade-off. To avoid large rebound effects, VAT 
rate subsidies may have to be restricted to A+, A++ as discussed above and not include A. 
But that may not be cost-effective in present conditions. We discuss in chapter 4 whether 
promotion of top performing classes such as A+, A++ could nonetheless be justified due to 
future lower production costs associated with quicker and larger scale deployment of such 
products promoted by VAT or other financial instruments. However, the empirical evidence 
does not support that this be cost effective. Yes, these products may become cheaper, but it 
will come at the costs of lost innovation efforts elsewhere in the economy. 
 
Are VAT rate subsides the most effective subsidy instrument? 
If it is deemed worthwhile to move forward with a subsidy scheme to encourage consumers 
to purchase products that can save them money even in the absence of a subsidy, the ques-
tion of what the most effective instrument is, remains. A key issue here is the choice between 
a reduced VAT rate on the energy efficient variant to be allowed in the relevant VAT direc-
tive or a national subsidy scheme. We will review this choice from two main perspectives 
namely the ability to target the subsidy precisely to its purpose and possible compliance 
costs. 
 
As regards targeting, a VAT based system has two disadvantages.  The first has to do with 
the way classifications are carried out. For each product group that is energy efficiency la-
belled, there are subcategories, typically defined by capacity; a freezer’s energy efficiency is 
not measured by its absolute energy use but by how much energy it uses relative to other 
freezers with same “size”. So a large freezer may well receive an A and a small freezer a B, 
even if the latter in fact uses less energy. Reducing the VAT rate on the big A rated freezer 
while keeping it constant on the B rated small freezer may well encourage households to ex-
change a small for a larger freezer -- and a small boiler with a larger boiler – with more en-
ergy being consumed. That is one of the ways how the rebound effect is going to work in 
practice.  
 
Both a VAT rate reduction and a national subsidy scheme could be restricted to cover only 
smaller categories.  However, this would leave out incentives to reduce energy consumption 
for the larger categories. The advantage of a national subsidy scheme is that it also could 
cover larger freezers etc., by way of a very simple benchmark mechanism: you define a stan-
dard sized B freezer, measure its efficiency and provide a subsidy to all freezers with higher 
energy efficiency. The size of the subsidy would depend directly on the distance in terms of 
energy efficiency to this standard. An A++ rated larger freezer might then get a subsidy pro-
vided it was more efficient than the smaller B rated benchmark model. 
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The second disadvantage results from the fact that high rated products such as A+ and A++ 
not only are more energy efficient, but also tend to be more luxurious. That is one of the 
reasons for them being more expensive. So a lower VAT rate is not only a subsidy to energy 
efficiency within a given size class, but also a subsidy to more luxurious products. Here a na-
tional subsidy system could provide a fixed absolute premium to products that meet certain 
standards. 
 
These two examples provide a key lesson. Just as root taxation is the prime instrument to 
achieve energy GHG and energy savings, so are “root” subsidies the most effective subsidies 
with ad valorem subsidies such as reduced VAT rates falling behind in effectiveness.  
 
On compliance costs, the relative verdict between VAT and other subsidies are more mixed 
but again fall out mainly to the benefit of a targeted national subsidy system. A clear example 
of the latter is the so-called mixed supply problem. Boilers for domestic heating and larger 
white goods are typically sold as a mix of a service (installation) and physical item. The 
product may for example be linked to a larger renovation of a residence. If VAT rates for the 
good is lower than for the service,
8 consumers and suppliers have a joint interest in over de-
claring the value of the reduced rate item and under declaring the value of the service sold at 
a standard rate. The same argument applies to a situation where a family at the same time is 
buying a B rated refrigerator for the summer house and an A rated freezer for the main resi-
dence. 
 
This problem could largely be overcome in a national subsidy system with a given absolute 
premium for a given product as discussed above.  Under such a system, the VAT rate on the 
installation service and actual product would be the same while the consumer would simply 
pay the absolute reduced price of the energy efficient boiler. The supplier could be made re-
sponsible for the administration of this subsidy and essentially make a discount in the final 
price of that amount. The customer could verify the transaction to the relevant budgetary 
authority through the vendor. 
 
Public finance consequences: revenue losses and distortions  
Root taxation with selective subsidies on top has public finance costs that are largely absent 
from the policy debate but can nonetheless be important. 
 
The basic premise starts with root taxation as main instrument to punish externalities. EU 
has ETS for the power sector and selected industries plus national taxes for non-covered sec-
tors such as domestic heating. Revenues will be recycled to ensure broad neutrality on labour 
market etc.  
 
                                                           
8 VAT rates in the context of renovations is currently being discussed in the Council following the EU Commis-
sions recent proposal to allow lower rates in this areas to reduce non-tax declared work etc.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Now we introduce a selective subsidy, namely a lower VAT rate on energy efficient variants. 
With unchanged consumption patterns this provides VAT losses equal to between 1 and 2 
per cent of the VAT revenues cf. Table 1.8. However, the lower rate on the energy efficient 
good leads to dynamic tax losses as the consumption share of the products with reduced 
VAT rate increases. This requires a higher standard VAT rate than if only static gains were 
included.  In addition to this come revenues losses from lower revenues from auctioned ETS 
allowances and energy taxes outside the ETS sector if and only if the exercise leads to re-
duced energy use, the whole purpose of the exercise.  
 
Table 1.8 VAT revenue effects in scenario 2 applying the mandatory 5% VAT rate 
Determinants of dy-







cent of VAT 







loss, per cent of 
VAT revenues 
Total VAT revenue 
loss, 
per cent of GDP 
1 -1.7  18 -16  -0.3  -2.0  -0.1 
2 -1.2 21 -14  -0.2  -1.5  -0.1 
3 -0.9 21 -14  -0.2  -1.1  -0.1 
4 -0.6 18 -14  -0.1  -0.7  -0.0 
EU aggregate   -1.2  19  -14  -0.2  -1.5  -0.1 
Note: * Percentage points. Static, dynamic and total losses are calculated as percentage of benchmark VAT revenue. 
The static calculation captures the effect of changes in the structure of the VAT in scenario. The dynamic 
effect captures the effect of the consumption adjustments in the general equilibrium setting. The total effect 
is a sum of the two. VAT base change is in percentage of benchmark value. VAT rate change is in percent-
age points. Weighted averages. The results for the dynamic revenue loss and the total revenue loss have been 
obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Eurostat. 
 
If we leave the issues of energy taxes aside, selective VAT leads to a net increase in the effec-
tive marginal tax rate on labour. The argument is relatively straightforward. First we reduce 
taxes on energy efficient products while financing it with a higher VAT rate, leaving aside for 
the moment the dynamic effects. Assume, for simplicity, that from a marginal tax rate per-
spective, these two effects are netting each other out.
9  
 
Second, consumers are switching from other consumption to energy efficient goods. Such a 
shift in consumption leads to a tax loss. This dynamic tax loss needs to be financed through 
higher taxes, in our model with higher VAT rates, which are necessary in order to compen-
sate for both static and dynamic revenue losses from lower taxes on energy efficient products. 
So were are ending up in a situation where the overall tax burden – VAT revenues as a share 
of consumption -- is unchanged while the marginal rate of tax on labour goes up. That will 
lead to a welfare loss through reduced labour supply. 
 
This implies an additional criterion in the evaluation of cost effectiveness. The value to con-
sumers of being induced to buy product that actually would have saved them money even in 
                                                           
9 This would be the case if the income elasticity of energy goods was roughly equal to 1. In this case, consumers will 
spend one per cent more on energy efficient goods when they earn one per cent more, and hence regard a lower rate 
on these goods as having increased incentive to work that matches the effect of a lower VAT-rate.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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the absence of the subsidy, need to exceed the economic distortions from a higher marginal 
tax rate or labour. Such an evaluation would require more in-depth knowledge of key data 
etc. than has been possible for this study and would need to be carried out country by coun-
try and product by product for the particular subsidy scheme considered.
10 
1.5.  QUESTION 3: WILL LOWER VAT RATES DISTORT INTERNAL MARKETS  
The present political debate on reduced VAT centres around two versions as discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
 
We look at the pros and cons of these two versions from a joint national and internal market 
perspective 
 
The main arguments for a mandatory alternative are internal market concerns at the EU 
level. National schemes may be skewed in the interest of national producers, ensuring that 
their products benefit from subsidies. A more uniform business environment across the EU 
with less dispersion in fiscal incentives may prove helpful for innovation. Companies pro-
ducing and selling electrical appliances or domestic boilers will then face the same conditions 
in all countries. Furthermore, allowing individual countries the option of reducing their 
VAT rates may trigger non-trivial cross-border trade.  
 
The main arguments for voluntary reduced rates are mainly based on efficiency concerns at 
the national level. Results reported above suggest that uniform subsidies to countries with 
widely different circumstances, such as different levels of penetration of energy efficient vari-
ants, make little sense. In fact some countries may even see their energy consumption in-
crease. At the same time, Member States are faced with national targets to reach climate and 
energy policy goals.  Moreover, the potential fiscal costs and uncertain cost-effectiveness in 
general, makes it difficult to suggest a mandatory solution. 
 
Indeed our analysis suggests that energy efficient products to a very large extent have the 
characteristics that drive cross-border trade. They have global brand quality, relatively high 
prices, EU-wide guarantees and are typically not damaged by transport. Most problematic 
are consumer electronics, with white goods being on a close second place. For example, a 
class A oven that is sold at a price of €1500 is more likely to be traded across borders, in case 
of voluntary VAT reduction, than insulation materials of the same size with a price of €150, 
cf. Table 1.9.  
                                                           
10 In a  study for DG TAXUD, BIO (2009) confirm that net welfare benefits are highly depending on specific 
country circumstances as well as uncertain assumptions about a number of key variables see for example page 10-11 
in the executive summary.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 1.9 Ranking of the cross-border tradability of appliances. 



























































Note: The ranking is based on four parameters; price, weight, brand value and perishability during transport, cf. 
Chapter 4. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
1.6.  OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
This study has reviewed two options for VAT rate policy adjustment in line with EU’s cli-
mate policy objectives, namely (1) imposing standard rates on consumption of electricity 
and heating (2) introducing reduced rates on energy efficient household appliances, con-
sumer electronics and domestic boilers. 
 
On option one we recommend to move away from reduced rates on energy. It is in sharp 
conflict with moves towards pricing carbon and energy, and the adverse effects on income 
distribution can be dealt with more efficiently elsewhere. Furthermore, EU has, along with 
other importers of fossil fuels, an interest in reducing world prices of these goods inter alia 
through taxes to improve terms-of-trade. Bearing in mind the upcoming international cli-
mate negotiations, this would be the right signal to send. 
 
On option two, we maintain that root taxation, such as the successful ETS, is by far the 
most important instrument to encourage CO2 and energy savings. In addition to that, the 
EU is already planning to improve labelling, allowing consumers to react on higher energy 
prices as well as imposing minimum standards in areas where consumers are unlikely ever to 
react to price signals even with the best information possible. 
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The role for yet another instrument on top is of course smaller. The aim for a reduced VAT 
rate for energy efficient products would be to push the consumer who, in despite of all these 
initiatives, will not buy such products. If financial instruments are to be used on top, then 
national fixed amounts subsidy are superior in effectiveness and can be constructed so that 
they have no internal market complications. 
 
We therefore conclude that the hurdle rate for such reduced VAT rates should be very high 
and be given many green scores on our balanced scoreboard approach below c.f. Table 1.10.  
It is clear from our model experiments, that imposing the same VAT subsidy rules on all 
countries simply does not make sense, given highly different starting conditions. We there-
fore need to see what, if any, room there is for voluntarily reduced rates while keeping in 
mind the pressures on the internal market this may imply. 
 
Under these circumstances, we have the following assessments: 
 
Low priced white goods have the most potential, i.e. appear with the fewest red and most 
green lights in our scoreboard. Relatively low prices suggest that internal market issues are 
less problematic. Reduced targeting relative to a fixed amount subsidy is less of a problem 
because of relatively limited production variation within the group and little scope for tilting 
prices upwards for the targeted product to save tax in mixed supply situations. 
 
For all other products, the problems are too extensive, i.e. too many red marks. Internal 
market concerns with optional VAT rates are non-trivial. At the same time, much higher 
levels of targeting and less compliance burdens can be achieved with national subsidy 
schemes, while direct internal market problems with cross border sales are reduced: the sub-
sidy is not linked to a VAT rate but may, where relevant, be restricted to a delivery to resi-
dent households. 
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Table 1.10 Balanced scoreboard approach 
Financial subsidy rele-
vance… 
VAT instrument effectiveness relative 
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Note:  Green = High potential; Orange = Medium potential; Red = Low potential. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
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In this chapter we discuss cost-effectiveness of VAT differentiation to support environmen-
tally friendly goods in comparison to other instruments for reducing GHG emissions. 
 
We start by describing the conventional wisdom about taxing emissions where they origi-
nate. We then discuss under which circumstances these taxes should be supplemented by 
other regulatory measures and discuss the potential supplementary measures. 
 
Further, we identify and describe implementation problems of reduced VAT that threaten to 
render the scheme cost inefficient. Lastly, we discuss problems that arise from the increasing 
demand for energy consuming products that would follow a reduction of VAT. 
 
This study finds that even the best conceived VAT differentiation scheme may fail to reduce 
emissions due to rebound effects, i.e. more intensive use of energy efficient products. In ad-
dition, a reduced VAT on energy efficient goods would promote other characteristics than 
energy efficiency if they are typical for the highest rated goods. The study therefore calls for 
alternative instruments that are candidates to supplement ETS in reducing emissions. 
2.1.   WHY IS ROOT TAXATION COST EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING GHG EMISSIONS? 
 
Root taxation (taxing emissions where they originate) is typically considered the most cost 
effective solution meeting GHG emission reduction goals.  
 
The argument in favour of root taxation is that the tax on emissions communicates the cost 
of environmental damages to the polluters and ensures that they take it into account when 
deciding how much to pollute, because it is costly for them to pollute. Therefore, with func-
tioning root taxation, energy efficiency is expected to spread in a bottom-up manner via 
economic incentives and without the need to be encouraged by separate regulation.  
 
In practice, adding the cost of pollution to prices by means of the tax gives polluters an in-
centive to use energy efficiently. Polluters can be the end users of energy, i.e. households. For 
example, in the case of electricity, the EU ETS can be considered an example of root taxa-
tion of CO2 emissions. The tax is levied on the supplier of electricity in the form of an emis-
sion allowance whose price is passed through to energy consumers. In response to higher 
prices, consumers reduce their electricity consumption through adopting energy efficiency. 
In order for this process to take place in a cost effective manner, the customer must have ac-
cess to information on energy efficiency, e.g. via labelling of electricity consuming products.  
 
Root taxation can also be applied to emissions outside the ETS. Currently, the inclusion of 
emissions from transportation and agriculture is being considered into the ETS. Further-
more, a range of other taxes are already in place, including excises on energy and the VAT – 
although the level of taxation differs. Low taxes, in general, encourage energy use and hinder 
energy efficiency – while the opposite is true for high taxes.  
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The level of excises varies between countries, but also in relation to the ETS CO2 emission 
quota prices, cf. Table 2.1. 17 member states maintain relatively low excises on both natural 
gas and heating oil – which in fact are below the average ETS quota prices at €20. Those 
countries are likely to face more significant adjustment costs than e.g. Slovenia, Finland, 
Austria or Italy where the level of fuel excises is not markedly different from average ETS 
quota prices. On the other hand, Denmark and Sweden levy excises that exceed the average 
ETS quota prices.  
 
Table 2.1: Excise duties on heating energy fuels in the EU vs. ETS quota prices 
Note: Excise rates quoted in € / GJ are converted into € / tCO2 using emission factors for the respective fuels.  
Kilde:DG Taxud(2008) and Energistyrelsen, DK. 
 
The principle of taxing at root can be applied to achieve cost-effective abatement for non-
CO2 pollution as well. In general, to correct environmental problems one should consider 
first whether a tax can be applied at the root of the problem.  For example, to reduce meth-
ane (CH4) emissions, a tax may be considered on its main sources, i.e. agriculture and min-
ing. To reduce water consumption, a tax on water use may be considered, to reduce the use 
of pesticides, a tax on pesticide use may be considered and so forth. 
2.2.  MOTIVATION FOR SUPLEMENTARY MEASURES 
 
Root taxation may have to be supplemented w i t h  o t h e r  m e a s u r e s  t o  e n s u r e  f u l l  c o s t -
effectiveness of climate and energy policies. We identify four potential market failures stem-
ming from: 
 
    Heating oil 
    Excise duty lower than  
   15 € / t CO2  
Excise duty between  
15-25 €/ t CO2   
Excise duty higher than 
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  lack of awareness or information about the benefits of energy efficiency 
  size of energy savings 
  affordability of more efficient products 
  occurrence of principal-agent problems 
 
The constraints of the internal market, including cross border trade, may also in certain cases 
prevent member states from increasing gasoline and diesel taxes: private consumers and 
haulers may respond by tanking up in other countries with lower consumer prices. We ex-
plore this issue in chapter 4. 
 
In this subchapter we investigate each of the above problems and discuss measures that could 
be used to remedy them.  
Lack of awareness or information 
Potentially the most rudimentary barrier in the adoption of energy efficiency is the lack of 
awareness on the side of consumers that energy efficient products are economically more fa-
vourable than their inefficient alternatives. If customers are not aware of the merits of energy 
efficient products, they will not demand them and the overall efficiency will not improve. 
Financial instruments would not directly increase the consumers’ awareness of energy effi-
ciency, but there are other more focused measures that could be taken. Two such initiatives 
are labelling schemes and energy auditing. 
 
Labelling schemes have been developed to provide information. In a nutshell, labelling 
should communicate that energy efficient products have lower consumption of energy and 
other resources so that their cost over their lifetime is lower in comparison to less efficient al-
ternatives. Labelling has been shown to have a very strong impact on consumer choice.
11 
 
However, the presence of labelling does not guarantee that customers are aware of their exis-
tence or are able to interpret the benefits. As of present, some products may have their own 
labelling schemes, and not all labelling schemes may be unified across sectors and countries. 
The lack of harmonisation may be a barrier to the spreading of information on energy effi-
ciency. This is also acknowledged by the Commission in their proposal for a community la-
belling scheme for environmentally friendly products.
12  
 
A supplementary path to better informed consumers is energy auditing which has proven to 
be effective, cf. Box 2.1. A possible policy might therefore be to reduce the VAT rate for en-
ergy audits.  One snatch is energy auditors might not be hired in the first place because con-
sumers may have a lack of awareness of its´ effects. If consumers knew that there were cost-
effective improvements that reduce energy consumption available, then they would have im-
                                                           
11 Newell et al. (1998) in a study covering the period from 1955 to 1995 in the US showed that the effect of higher 
energy prices on the product mix of energy using products were strongly amplified by the introduction of labelling 
schemes.  
12European Commission (2008)    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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plemented those improvements already. Financial support for energy audits would not help 
overcome this lack of information.  In this respect its effect will differ from reduced rates on 
white goods and boilers which often will have effects on purchasing decisions the consumer 
has already taken: we need a new fridge, the question is which one? Here the purpose is to 
trigger a decision which the consumer has not yet thought above. 
 
However, financial support could give incentives to hire energy auditors and thereby reduce 
energy consumption when consumers are facing financial constraints in financing audits 
they believe could lead to cost savings.  
 
If a financial instrument should be applied in this area, we believe that a reduced VAT is less 
effective than a fixed sum subsidy.  In particular, the ad valorem structure of a VAT rate re-
duction gives incentives to fit as many services as possible into the energy auditing, firms 
might in addition to energy auditing offer broader advice services at the reduced VAT rate.  
In short: both with a reduced VAT and a fixed sum subsidy there is a need to define what an 
energy audit consist of and verify that: the advantage of fixed sum subsidy is that it can be 
limited to what is considered necessary to carry out a basic service. It is for example not ob-
vious that prosperous families with no financial constraints living in very large houses – and 
thus with a large potential for savings – should be subsidised to undertake activities in their 
own interest beyond this basic amount.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Box 2.1 Energy auditing – A means of information dissemination 
An energy audit is an inspection, survey and analysis of energy flows in a building, process or system with 
the objective of understanding the energy dynamics of the system under study. An energy audit is typically 
conducted to seek opportunities to reduce the amount of energy input without negatively affecting the 
output(s). When the object of study is an occupied building then reducing energy consumption while main-
taining or improving human comfort, health and safety are of primary concern. Beyond simply identifying 
the sources of energy use, an energy auditor seeks to prioritise the energy uses according to cost-
effectiveness and suggest improvements where they are cost-effective.  
 
According to article 12 in the directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services Member States are 
obliged to ensure the availability of energy audits for market segments where they are not sold commer-
cially. Programme level energy audit activities, both pure energy audit programmes and other programmes  
where energy audits play an important role, are quite well represented in the EU Member States and Nor-
way as well as in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) . Some level of energy auditing can be 
said to exist more or less in all countries. In the EU Member States and Norway the total number of pure 
energy audit programmes is 13 in 7 countries.  
 
Finland as role model 
The country with the longest tradition of energy auditing as a key instrument in the national energy effi-
ciency policy and a main tool in the energy conservation activities since 1992, is Finland. There, a substan-
tial system of method development, training, quality control and data management has been established 
and trained auditors are authorised to perform audits that may enjoy government subsidy (40-50 per cent), 
provided that the results are delivered to the central audit data bank. There are tailored energy auditing 
methods for each type of energy consuming facility as well as for the various phases of the lifetime of 
these facilities. For example, there are specified auditing methods for industrial plants and residential 
buildings, for new or renovated buildings, and for follow-up after several years have passed since the previ-
ous audit or after some essential changes have taken place in the use of the facility. 
 
Energy auditing in other countries 
France launched a full scale energy audit programme called "Aide à la Décision" (Decision Making Support 
Scheme) in 1999. This programme has complete management procedures, detailed guidelines, a monitoring 
procedure and a charter for auditors. Audits are subsidised by different percentages according to the used 
auditing model and are targeted at all sectors (building, industry) excluding individual houses, for which a 
self-auditing tool is available through the internet. 
 
In Germany the Federal Ministry of Economics launched an energy saving promotion programme called 
“Vor-Ort-Beratung” in 1991. The programme has been running since then and is considered very effective, 
especially in the rehabilitation of old buildings. The energy audit services are authorised to engineers and 
consulting companies around the nation but due to a diversified nature of the programmes very little col-
lective information on the results, total volumes of audited buildings and implemented energy saving 
measures is available. 
 
In the Netherlands the Energy and Environmental Advice, an individual energy audit support programme 
and commonly used energy audit model, was finalised in 2000. Target groups were all small and medium-
sized enterprises, governmental and non-profit organisations. Small and medium sized companies could 
apply for support (max 50 per cent of the costs) to undertake an audit on a voluntary basis. For private 
homes, Energy Performance Advice (EPA) is a support scheme for private homes. Owners of homes built 
before 1998 can apply for an EPA by approaching a local adviser who will pay a visit and see what energy-
saving measures are to be taken.  
 
The effectiveness of this format of information dissemination is exemplified by the results of a Finnish 
study by Department of Home Economics, VTT Building Technology and Finnish District Heating Associa-
tion. They found that following monthly feedback and focused energy saving advice, 54 per cent of house-
holds reduced energy consumption by turning off lighting in empty rooms, 27 per cent lowered room tem-
perature, 27 per cent dressed more warmly and 23 per cent paid attention to thermostat valves. Further-
more, 40 per cent of respondents reported that the monthly meter reading feedback they received on their 
energy consumption made them think about their consumption, and 13 per cent altered their habits follow-
ing the feedback. The results also showed that households were able to reduce monthly electricity con-
sumption by 11-16 per cent without compromising their level of comfort. Furthermore, heating energy con-
sumption decreased by an average of 5 per cent following meter readings and by 3-9 per cent following 
feedback on consumption compared to previous year. Electricity consumption in the treatment groups de-
creased an average of 17-21 per cent following feedback, however, there was little influence linked to advice 
which was given after feedback. 
Source:  Official Journal of the European Union (2006); EC (2006) (1995) Seppo et al.(2006) Sussex Energy 
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Size of energy savings 
If the size of energy savings in a single unit is insignificant in absolute monetary terms, it 
may be disregarded by the consumer. The lower the energy saving, the greater the likelihood 
that the search costs borne by the consumer to buy the product will prevail over the effi-
ciency saving, and the consumer will not make the most energy efficient purchase. Further-
more, the lower purchase price today may be preferred to small savings if they come dis-
persed over time, although the empirical evidence for such effects in a situation with full 
consumer knowledge about future cost savings is limited in general
  see Box 2.2 below. For 
example, replacing a 75W incandescent light bulb with the equivalent energy efficient light 
bulb may generate savings of the order of magnitude of €75 over a five year lifetime
13 of the 
bulb, amounting to €15 per year so only €1.25 per month
14 which may be barely noticeable 
on the monthly energy bill. In consequence, consumers may disregard taking a separate trip 
to another vendor carrying compact fluorescent bulbs if their local store only carries incan-
descent bulbs – even though they know that fluorescent bulbs save money over their life-
time. The size of average energy savings for any separate product is typically less than € 20 
per annum, cf. Table 2.2. A notable exception is boilers where the savings potential is much 
larger. 
  
Table 2.2 Average energy savings for different products  
Product  Savings  energy consumption 
(kWh) per year 
Savings in € per year 
Refrigerators  40  7.10 
Freezers  92  16.40 
Washing Machines  69  12.20 
Dishwashers  57  10.00 
Ovens  41  7.30 
Boilers  9000  1620.00 
Note: Assumed energy price 18 €cent/kWh, the average energy price in Europe including taxes. The savings are cal-
culated as the difference between the weighted average energy consumption of products rated A and better 
and products rated B or worse. Energy consumption is weighted by average sales in each efficiency class. 
The boilers that are compared are standard boilers versus condensing boilers. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, energy.eu, IVM (2008), Chalkley et al (2001) 
 
Since consumers may fail to react on marketing declarations about the long term savings ob-
tained from buying the energy efficient variant, a financial instrument that lowers the pur-
chase price would help remedy this problem. In short, consumers notice a lower price, not 
information on the back of the product. 
 
 
                                                           
13 US News & World Report, 19 December 2007. 
14 Chernoff (2008)   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Box 2.2 Consumer discount rates: what do we really know? 
A literature survey by Train (1985) is used as the key reference on consumer discount rates in a study for 
TAXUD by BIO et al. (2009). The report states that consumers systematically discount future energy saving 
at rates way above market rates of interest. Apart from the literature survey being rather old, we first state 
that the methodologies used to derive the estimates tend to be biased. Basically, they look at energy using 
products being bought by households and then estimate the savings consumers could reach by switching to 
the most energy efficient models.  If these savings are very large relative to the purchase price, it is inferred 
that consumer have very large discount rates. But this approach systematically contains a potential bias by 
assuming that all products are put to the same use. A priori reasoning suggests households that use energy 
consuming products at low intensity – e.g. heater placed in summer cottages or a bachelor residence – ra-
tionally may prefer a product with a lower purchase price even at the cost of some higher energy costs in 
use.  So they do not necessarily have high discount rates. Second, we note that Train (1985) suggests that 
the high estimated discount rates may imply that consumers had problems detecting “differences in en-
ergy uses” for the products being bought. This suggests that lack of labelling is the problem i.e. an informa-
tion problem. This is empirically supported by another US study by Newell (1998) that found that the im-
pact of higher energy prices in terms of consumers preferring more energy efficient product variants were 
amplified once improved labelling came into place. 
Source: Train (1985), BIO et al. (2009) pp. 146-149, Newell (1998).  
Affordability of energy efficient products 
The efficient products are typically more expensive to purchase than the inefficient products; 
therefore some households may be prevented from purchase efficient products due to failures 
associated with financing. For instance, hybrid or electric cars are at present 1.5 – 2 times 
more expensive than combustion engine cars. Let us assume that the higher purchase price is 
retrieved during the cars life span through lower fuel expenses. The difference in purchase 
prices in practice entails that households are required to take a higher loan which may be re-
fused by a financial institution – in spite of long term benefits of using a hybrid car. There-
fore, a household may be forced to purchase a combustion engine car which is more expen-
sive over its lifetime, but cheaper to acquire. In consequence, a market failure on the side of 
financing the household’s purchases of energy efficient products may hinder the adoption of 
efficient products. So that even if the household would like to acquire the energy efficient 
car, in this case, it is not able to due to problems with financing. 
 
The argument is strongest for goods with relatively high costs such as cars or white goods. 
An interesting example of the potential effects on the effect lower prices on energy efficient 
variants is presented by the UK retailer Comet that in March 2008 cut VAT on some of 
their products, cf. Box 2.3. 
   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Box 2.3 UK experiment – VAT cut on energy efficient goods 
COMET’S VAT PROMOTION – MARCH / APRIL 2008 
 
Recently, an experiment, proving customers’ sensitivity to price changes on electrical appliances, was per-
formed in the British market. 
 
On the back of Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s plan to cut VAT on greener electrical appliances, the electri-
cal specialist Comet participated in a trial with deduction of VAT on energy efficient white goods. The trial 
lasted for 29 days, starting on the 20
th of March, 2008.  
 
In the trial, the VAT equivalent of 14.9 per cent was cut from the price of 150 A, A+ and A++-rated products 
sold by Comet in it’s over 250 stores across the country.  The items covered by the trial represented a wide 
variety of products, spread all over the price range. However, the majority of the A, A+ and A++-rated prod-
ucts marketed by Comet were not included. This enabled analysis of sales figures for those products that 
were energy efficient, but still not covered by the VAT reduction. 
 
The results indicated the importance of purchase price in consumption decisions taken by customers – 
there is a willingness to buy energy efficient products, but the purchase also has to make short term finan-
cial sense 
 
The sales of energy efficient products included in the trial rose by more than two thirds when the VAT cost 
was removed. The impact of the price decrease was consequent across the entire product range, and in 
more than 90 per cent of the products covered by the trial, an increase in sales was seen. The growth in 
sales was even more significant for A+ and A++-rated products than A-rated products. Sales of products 
not covered by the VAT cut declined by about a third. The most significant decline in sales was seen on 
those A, A+ and A++-rated products not covered by the trial. This was an expected effect, however, as 
these products form a closer substitute to the ones included in the project, then the products with a lower 
rating in energy efficiency. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a problem with the interpretation of this kind of temporary experiments. When the 
price decrease is limited to a short period of time, there is an increased incentive for customers to make 
their purchases during this particular period; compared to if the price change was permanent. Conse-
quently, we can expect the increase in sales to be less significant in case of a permanently cut VAT than 
during the temporary price change in the experiment. 
Source: Correspondence with HM Treasury, Comet (2008) 
 
While this case study does suggest that lower prices may lead to higher markets shares of 
more energy efficient products, it does not imply that the purchase of an energy efficient ap-
pliance is a cost-effective way to reduce emissions of GHG.  
Principal-agent problems 
Principal-agent problems, often involving the landlord-tenant relationships, may hinder the 
adoption of energy efficiency. Several types of principal agent problems have been identified 
in this setting of which the situation when the landlord purchases the appliance but the ten-
ant pays the running costs is the most frequent.  A recent study suggested that principal 
agent problems may in principal affect up to 30 per cent of energy consumption in the 
OECD countries (IEA 2007).  
 
As housing rental marked is mostly VAT-exempt, landlords would in fact benefit from a re-
duced VAT rate on energy efficient boilers, insulation materials etc
15.  
                                                           
15 As a rule, the leasing or letting of buildings is exempted from VAT (without right of deduction of the input 
VAT). However, Member States may apply exclusions to the scope of this exemption or may allow enterprises 
("taxable persons" for VAT purposes) a right of option for taxation (in which case the output is taxed and the input 




However, hard core evidence in support of a slow adoption of energy saving equipment as a 
result of Principal Agent problems is not that strong. An example of the ambiguity of the 
evidence is a study which uses experience from the Netherlands. In support of the PA prob-
lem, it is observed that  owner occupied housing which by definition has zero PA problems 
had a much higher level of implementation of energy savings measures over a whole range of 
products than private lettings cf. Table 2.3.  
 
However, at the same time implementation of such measures in social housing is broadly at 
the same levels as in owner occupied housing?  Are there a priori arguments for PA problems 
being smaller there? Moreover, the study itself suggest that families living in owner occupied 
housing may use more energy per square meter per year
16. The unstated implication is that 
they also have a larger return on energy savings investments. This just underlines that the 
cost-effectiveness of any energy saving device or measure is directly linked to the intensity of 
the use of the underlying product.  What may be a good investment for a large family with 
five children using a lot of hot water, electricity, etc. may not be so for a young, single adult 
spending limited time in his or her apartment. 
  
Table 2.3 Energy measures implemented in the residential sector in the Netherlands, 
2000 
Measure  Building segment 
       Owner occupied              Social housing                 Private letting 
Roof insulation  70%  59%  40% 
Wall insulation  52%  55%  29% 
Floor insulation  39%  30%  21% 
Insulated glazing  70%  67%  48% 
Boiler (improved yield)  43%  60%  54% 
Condensing Boiler (high yield) 47%  26%  25% 
Source: IEA (2007) 
 
More generally, a private landlord will have a long term interest in reducing the energy bill 
of his tenants.  Tenants are likely to put some weight on their energy bills when they choose 
where to live. In a perfect housing market, higher energy costs would have to be compen-
sated through lower rents. Alternatively, a landlord that implements equipment that can ef-
fectively reduce total costs of energy – both capital costs and running cots – will be able to 
offer lower rents and yet make more profits.  
 
The current housing markets are typically far from perfect and may not facilitate cost-
effective adoption of energy savings devices even when landlords so wish. The landlord may 
for example be unable to recuperate the capital costs associated with the upgrading or may 
                                                                                                                                                
able transaction with right of deduction of input VAT and an exempted transaction without right of deduction are 
possible. 
16 IEA (2007) page 135.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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have to go through a lengthy consultation process with tenants to achieve such objectives. 
However, that may represent more a failure of rent regulation law than a PA problem per se. 
 
Our conclusion is then twofold. First, the empirical evidence at least as offered in the large 
survey from IEA does not contain strong evidence of PA problems related to tenant-landlord 
problems. Second, weak adoption of energy saving measures may result from other structural 
barriers such as rent regulation that could be directly addressed. 
2.3.  LABELLING, MINIMUM STANDARDS, PROMOTION OF THE BEST PERFORMERS 
 
In view of the market failures hindering the adoption of energy efficiency, it may in selective 
case be justified to introduce supplementary legislation to correct for them. The possible 
regulation considered can be broken into three steps:  
 
  Enforcing (mandating) and harmonizing labelling schemes – labelling directives  
  Taking the worst performing products out of the market – minimum efficiency 
standard directives 
  Promoting the best performing products – e.g. proposed reduced VAT 
 
In the case of some products, the EU has already moved a long way along the lines of the 
above regulation, while more products are added to the coverage. The legislation has a num-
ber of implications for promoting energy efficiency.  
 
Mandatory and harmonized labelling defines the energy efficiency of a product and commu-
nicates that to the consumer. In short, labelling reduces the potential market failure of lack 
of information or lack of awareness about energy efficiency.  
 
Minimum efficiency standards (MES) prevent consumers from choosing the least efficient 
products – the worst performers. Together with labelling, the presence of MES effectively 
bans the least efficient products from the EU market. As a result the EU market comprises 
only the range of more efficient products available on the world market, cf. Figure 2.1.  
 
Labelling also serves to make the best in class more visible and thereby promote energy effi-
ciency. In this way, labelling provides incentives for the best performers – although they may 
still be more expensive than less efficient alternatives. Therefore, with the labelling and 
minimum efficiency standards alone, consumers may not necessarily realise full gains from 
adopting energy efficient goods. Labelling does not solve the market failure that has to do 
with higher purchase prices of energy efficient products. A budget-constrained consumer 
may still prefer products with low purchase price, especially if the remaining market failures 
– low absolute size of energy savings and low relative size of energy savings are present along-
side the higher price of energy efficient products. Labelling alone does not make it cheaper 




Therefore, additional instruments may be required to supplement labelling and minimum 
efficiency standards to promote the best in class products by lowering their prices. The pro-
posed lower VAT on the most energy efficient products would serve to lower their purchase 
price relative to the less efficient products on the EU market, cf. Figure 2.1.   
 
Figure 2.1 Regulation promoting energy efficiency  
 
Note:  Threshold 1 is defined by technological development, policies around the world and consumer choice. 
Thresholds 2 and 3 are defined by European policy. Thresholds 1, 2 and 3 may be set differently for differ-
ent products. 
 Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
An integrated use of different means of regulation has been proposed by the Commission in 
the action plan on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial 
Policy
17. In brief, it suggests that minimum requirements shall apply to all energy-using 
products and that the scope of the current labelling directive is extended.  
                                                           
17 EC (2008d)   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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2.4.   VAT RATE REDUCTION VERSUS ALTERNATIVE SUBSIDIES 
 
A financial subsidy such as reduced VAT rates may correct for market failures that stems 
from the adversities described above In particular, a reduced price could encourage retailers 
to more broadly market products that in fact are in the consumer’s best interest, affects pur-
chase decision directly by the consumer not needing spend too much time on reading labels. 
It could also tip the cash-constrained household to buy a class A refrigerator that they know 
is more energy efficient but do not have the means to buy. They need a reasonably sized re-
frigerator so they cannot simply trade down to a smaller but more efficient refrigerator as 
easily as they can with a car. However it would have little meaningful effect in situations 
where the energy use of a product is very small relative to total price. There is, for example, 
little meaning in having computers graded by electricity use and then providing a purchase 
subsidy for the most efficient. 
 
The question to be addressed here is whether a reduced VAT rate is the best instrument to 
provide such a subsidy. We would here make a distinction between four variants of financial 
instruments and then finishing the section with an overall evaluation of these based upon 
three evaluation criteria: 
  targeting the objective (“efficiency”) 
  compliance costs 
  internal market complications 
 
As regards the four variants, they are created by a combination of two dimensions of the sub-
sidy. We can have either a fixed amount of subsidy determined by energy class or an ad 
valorem subsidy being a function of both the price of the product and its energy class.  This 
is what we call the “determination of the subsidy” in Table 2.4, below. Moreover, we can 
provide this subsidy either at the retail level to all consumers irrespective of their nationality 
or only to residents of the country choosing to operate this system. This is what we call the 
“method of distribution of the subsidy”. When we mix the combinations we get four vari-
ants with the VAT subsidy based on energy class being an example of one of these four vari-
ants cf. Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 The four variants of financial instruments 
  Method of distribution of subsidy 
  Retail based for all consumers  Only for residents of a country 
Fixed amount deter-
mined by energy class  Fixed amount to all consumers  Fixed amount only for residents  Determination 
of subsidy level  Ad valorem subsidy 
based on energy class 
Ad valorem for all consumers 
(VAT rebate one version)  Ad valorem only for residents 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
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Fixed versus ad valorem subsidy such as VAT rate reductions 
On efficiency grounds, we conclude first that a fixed amount subsidy is superior to a VAT 
reduction. Consumer choice and price differences are affected by a number of other factors 
than differences in development costs associated with building more efficient products. So a 
reduced VAT rate on all products fulfilling energy efficiency criteria will in fact also be a 
subsidy to buy more upmarket versions of A-rated products or larger A-rated products. 
 
A few practical examples show that such concerns are important. Firstly, for each product 
group that is energy efficiency labelled, there are subcategories, typically defined by capacity: 
so appliances´ energy efficiency is not measured by its absolute energy use but by how much 
energy it used relative to other freezers with same “size”. In consequence, a large freezer may 
well receive an A and a small freezer a B, even if the latter in fact uses less energy. Reducing 
the VAT rate on the big A rated freezer while keeping it constant on the B rated small freezer 
may well encourage households to exchange a small for a larger freezer, and a small boiler 
with a larger boiler – with more energy being consumed. In short, you may be tempted to 
exchange a SAMSUNG with the larger and more expensive Siemens if you want more ca-
pacity cf. Table 2.5.  
 
Second, high rated products such as A+ and A++ not only are more energy efficient, but also 
tend to be more luxurious. That is one of the reasons for them being more expensive. So a 
lower VAT rate not only is a subsidy to energy efficiency within a given size class, but also a 
subsidy to more upmarket products. For instance, the price spread of A rated washing ma-
chines is substantial even within the same capacity category, possibly due to brand value and 
design. Furthermore, there are A rated washing machines that are less expensive than B rated 
models, cf. Table 2.5. So, in practice you would get a subsidy to upgrade in luxury value 
from a Hotpoint to a SAMSUNG with no energy efficiency gain as counterpart (both with 
wash load of 6 kilos). 
 
Table 2.5 Price spread of washing machines in the UK 









Zanussi ZWC1300W  B  3 kg  A  B  389.95 
Hotpoint WML540G  A  6 kg  A  B  248.97 
SAMSUNG WF-B1456GW/XEU A  6kg  A  B  349.99 
Siemens WM14S795GB  A  8 kg  A  B  957.00 
Source: UK electronics retailer Comet  
 
The primacy of root taxation/root reward as the best instrument is even more paramount 
with respect to reducing environmental damage from the use of pesticides and fertilisers 
where the role of VAT rates has also been raised.  While emissions of CO2 from the use of a 
ton of coal in power plant near Paris has the same climate effect as in power plant near War-
saw, that is clearly not the case for the use of fertilisers and pesticides.  The damage depends 
both on the soil it is used on and the damage increases exponentially with its local use.  The 
first kilo may in fact not be problematic at all, the second potentially while the third and   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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fourth kilo on the same surface creates real problems in terms of pollution of rivers, drinking 
water quality.  Our conclusion in line with a number of studies is then that effective finan-
cial incentives and penalties need to recognise the local character of the environmental prob-
lem. We discuss the VAT rate policy with respect to pesticides and fertilisers in somewhat 
more detail in a case study following chapter 2, very briefly also raising issues such as effect 
on agricultural production etc. 
 
In conclusion, just as a fixed sum charge on the specific damaging activity (“root taxation”), 
is the best way to discourage negative externalities such as CO2 emissions, so is a fixed sum 
reward the best way to reward good behaviour.  This could be attained by a national subsidy 
scheme that would provide a fixed absolute premium to products that meet certain standards 
providing. Such a scheme has the advantage as compared to a VAT reduction (or any other 
ad valorem subsidy) that it does not promote more luxurious products or upgrades to larger 
capacity.  Further its size can be better targeted, taking into account price elasticities. 
 
Seen from the consumer perspective, there would not be much difference between a fixed 
amount subsidy and a VAT reduction provided that they were both administered at the re-
tail/supplier level. The supplier/retailer would simply subtract the relevant rebate from the 
bill. If there are strings attached as in a residence based system, the compliance costs are also 
likely to be equal for the consumer. To increase the effectiveness of the scheme as much ad-
ministration should be on the vendor so to relieve the customer from having to contact 
tax/subsidy responsible authorities directly. 
 
For enterprises and tax authorities a fixed amount of subsidy will have by far the lowest 
compliance costs relative to VAT rate subsidy. This should be seen in conjunction with the 
mixed supply problem. The mixed supply problem relates to the fact that a product subject 
to reduced VAT is consumed together with other product(s) or service(s) not subject to re-
duced VAT: this issue was discussed intensively in our previous report on reduced VAT.  
One example is a customer buying both an expensive A rated freezer and at the same time a 
B-rated washing machine. Both vendor and purchaser has an incentive to inflate the re-
corded sales price on the former and reduce it for the later, thus reducing the total VAT bill 
while then splitting the gain. Tax authorities will face non-trivial costs in monitoring or 
challenging such billing practice. However, if the subsidy was a fixed amount, the vendor 
and purchaser would reap no gain from such shifting of prices. 
 
The presence of mixed supply issues can potentially also generate incentives to shift “value 
added” towards the low rate within the building sector are presented in Box 2.4. This issue is 
linked to the Council discussion of the EU Commission proposal from July 2008 that pro-
vides an optional reduced rate on services rated to renovation etc. inter alia to reduce non-
tax worked in this sector
18. Essentially, to avoid such mixed supply problems, the proposal 
                                                           
18 The Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards reduced rates of value added 
tax (COM(2008) 428) presented by the Commission on 7 July 2008  includes the possibility for Member States to 
apply a reduced VAT rate to, among other things, "the supply of services consisting in the renovation ,repair, altera-  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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would oblige countries also to have lower rates on the building materials involved in such 
operation. In other words, the service and the good would be both standard rated or reduced 
rated. 
  
The conclusion in terms of use of financial instruments regarding this sector is pretty 
straightforward. If the Council follows the Commission proposals then rates are either stan-
dard rated or reduced rated for both the service and the good, in which case a fixed amount 
subsidy outside the VAT system is both best and the only instrument that can be used. Or, 
the rate for the service can be lower than the good, in which case a fixed amount subsidy 
outside the VAT system is just the best instrument, including eliminating mixed supply 
problems. 
Retail based with no strings attached or residence requirement 
The second issue is whether the subsidy should be retail based provided to all consumers 
with no strings attached or requiring proof of domestic residence. The potential advantage of 
the latter option is that internal market consequences from cross-border shopping can be 
avoided. Second by making the subsidy depending on residence, one could at the same time 
require that the old inefficient appliance is retired: that is impossible with a non-conditional 
supply to all consumers at the retail level
19.   
 
For consumers, retailers, suppliers and public authorities a pure no strings attached retail 
based system is the least costly to operate. There will slightly administrative higher costs if 
consumers have to verify address and other conditions, the retailer/supplier to take responsi-
bility for the verification and public authorities the obligation to check it. 
Overall evaluation of four subsidy variants 
Our all summary of the four variants of instruments are then summarised in Table 2.6. 
Fixed amount subsidies have the lowest compliance costs and are most targeted. Residence 
based systems avoid internal market problems at the cost at some, but not necessarily large, 
compliance costs. The VAT instrument is the least targeted instrument possible while repre-
senting the largest compliance costs and internal market complications. So our recommenda-
tion is very clear if a subsidy is to be used: 
 
  Use a fixed amount subsidy at the retail level available for all consumers for goods 
that have low “cross-border” trade potential see chapter 4 
                                                                                                                                                
tion, maintenance and cleaning of housing and of places of worship and of cultural heritage and historical monu-
ments recognised by the Member State concerned" This encompasses for example the supply and installation of in-
sulation material. The Commission took the view that the supply of this service cannot be split into "the installation 
part" and "the materials part" and considers that "one single transaction" (and thus one rate) is envisaged here. The 
Proposal is currently under discussion in the Council (as well as in the EP and ECOSOC). 
19 It is important to note, though, that measures such as scrapping equipment with many years of useful service is 
not necessarily sensible in a broader economic context. A conflict may here arrive between efficiency -- useful ex-
ploitation of economic resource – with effectiveness - making sure that energy savings are reached. When you leave 
the narrow road of root taxation and uses specific instruments to further increase energy savings, it may be difficult 
to reconcile that with overall high levels of economic efficiency.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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  Use a fixed amount subsidy with national residence verification for goods with high 
“cross-border” trade potential 
  We do not see a VAT rate reduction as a first choice for any product. 
 
Table 2.6 Evaluation of the four subsidy variants 
  Method of distribution of subsidy 
  Retail based for all consumers  Only for residents of a country 
Fixed amount determined 
by energy class 
 Good 
•  High targeting 
•  Low compliance costs 
for consumers 
•  Low compliance costs 
for enterprises and 
government 
  Bad 
•  Potentially internal 
market problems 
Good 
•  Targeting 
•  Low compliance costs 
for enterprises and 
government 
•  No internal market 
complications 
Bad 
•  Potentially more com-
pliance costs for verifi-
cation  Determination 
of subsidy level  Ad valorum subsidy based 
on energy class  Bad 
•  Low targeting particu-
lar VAT version with 
inflexible subsidy level 
•  Higher compliance 
costs (mixed supply 
problem) 




•  Low targeting particu-
lar in VAT version with 
inflexible subsidy level 
•  Higher compliance 
costs (mixed supply 
problem) 
God 
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Box 2.4: Mixed supply related to housing sector – An illustration 
For major installations such as new heating systems, there will inevitably be a joint supply of a service in-
stallation and equipment. If the VAT on the equipment is reduced while the VAT on the equipment remains 
unchanged then the service and the equipment will be separated tax wise, which allows households to gain 
from the lower VAT rate on the equipment. As a consequence, there is a risk that the price of the service 
from installers will be reduced, whereas the price of the equipment will be raised. Such a pricing strategy 
would decrease the overall price and thereby increase sales. 
 
To see the logics behind the installers pricing behaviour, consider the following example:  
A firm both sells and installs heating systems. Today the same VAT rate applies to both the physical 
equipment and the installation service. The firm charges € 2 000 euro for equipment and € 2 000 for instal-
lation exclusive of VAT, the VAT rate is 25 per cent which renders a cost of € 5 000 inclusive of vat. Now, 
the VAT rate on the equipment is reduced to 5 per cent while the VAT on the installation service is held 
constant. This results in a € 4 600 for the consumer, VAT on installation is still € 500 but the VAT on the 
equipment is reduced to € 100.  
 
The firm would now benefit from lowering their prices on installation while increasing prices on equipment. 
If they charge € 4 000 for equipment and install it for free, the consumer price would be only € 4 200 while 
the firm has the same revenue. Hence, they are able to lower their prices by € 400 due to the VAT reduction 
and an additional € 400 by altering their pricing strategy.  
 
The consumers do enjoy a reduction in price and the sales of heating systems with reduced VAT are likely to 
rise. These effects were most likely also the intention of the policymaker. However, the government’s loss 
of tax revenue is € 800 per installed heating system instead of the intended € 400. Further, there are com-
pliance costs due to, for instance, printing of new brochures and increased administrative burdens. The 
compliance costs fall on the installer. 
 
UK 
Where reduced rates are available under European VAT rules, these have been applied where they provide 
the most cost-effective and well-targeted support for the environmental objectives. For example, a 5 per 
cent, reduced rate applies to the installation of boilers that are designed to be fuelled solely by wood, straw 
and other vegetal matter; and to certain grant-funded installations of other boilers and heating appliances. 
Moreover, a reduced 5 per cent VAT applies to the installation of gas fired boiler plus radiators and pipe 
work in homes of poorer pensioners and the installation of "heating system measures" fitted in the homes 
of the less well-off. The reduced VAT rate is also widened to cover installation of energy saving materials in 
all homes. The cut in the VAT rate, from 17.5 per cent to 5 per cent applies to all insulation, draught strip-
ping, hot water and central heating system controls that people pay to have fitted in their homes. (HM 
Treasury Finance Bill 2000, clause 131) 
 
The introduction of reduced VAT rates on certain energy saving equipment is an extension of a reduced rate 
for a range of energy saving materials. The compliance costs of dealing with multiple VAT rates would most 
probably fall on installers, if they also install standard rated equipment.   
 
France 
Under the 2003 Finance Law, the reduced VAT rates apply to equipment for renewable energy production 
and use which is installed in primary or secondary residencies built for more than two years. The VAT rate is 
5.5 per cent in France and Corsica and 2.1 per cent in Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. The equipment 
must be bought from and installed by the same company.  
Source: Copenhagen Economics Copenhagen Economics, UK Parliament (2007), UK financial secretary to the 
Treasury (2005) 
2.5.  POLITICAL ECONOMY PROBLEMS WITH VAT AND OTHER SUBSIDIES 
The effectiveness of reduced VAT will differ due to features underlying the promoted prod-
uct – as well as issues with the design and implementation of labelling, and generic costs of 
operating a differentiated VAT system.  
 
Implementing reduced VAT on energy efficient products carries certain costs of compliance 
applying equally to all products.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Standards and labelling must be binding (they cannot be voluntary) – there is a need to de-
fine legally binding standards for all products where reduced VAT is considered. Voluntary 
standards or labelling are not appropriate because of the risk of non-compliance and lack of 
enforcement. Tax authorities would obviously have difficulties operating a tax system if the 
goods to be taxed are not well defined. In other words, in order to apply a reduced VAT, all 
products must always carry a label identifying which VAT is due.  
 
The need to have legally binding standards is not particularly a requirement of the reduced 
VAT – it would also be required for alternative instruments – but with VAT reductions 
there is more risk of entering into a political battlefield. A political level conflict could be 
that the government wants to safeguard tax revenues while business organisations push for a 
lower VAT for more goods in order to increase demand. In practice, a number of products 
are already subject to mandatory rules while more products are being constantly added. DG 
Transport and Energy monitors the status of implementation of efficiency and labelling cri-
teria in the Ecodesign directives. 
 
Producers of environmentally friendly goods have an incentive to provide labels that induce 
consumers to buy; they do however not share that incentive with non-environmental pro-
ducers. So there is a risk that voluntary standards by market participants may be weakly de-
veloped or of poor quality.  The ANEC (2007a) study reports that 20-30 per cent appliances 
found in shops investigated in the study were unlabelled. Furthermore, there is evidence in 
the same study of generally lax enforcement of labelling.  
 
The binding efficiency and labelling criteria need constant and rapid revaluation to keep up 
with technological progress. Keeping the criteria fixed will result in greater penetration of a 
given efficiency standard due to technological progress – more technological progress means 
that more freezers will be classified as A++ if the criteria remain unchanged. As the prevailing 
standard increases, the share of the market receiving subsidies increases. Furthermore, pro-
ducers lose the incentive to innovate once they reach the highest attainable label of effi-
ciency. To maintain innovative drive, standards should be continually increased. Ad hoc so-
lutions should be avoided; however, as ANEC (2007a) study contains evidence that intro-
ducing the A+ and A++ has sometimes led to confusing the consumers used to the old A-G 
scheme. Is the new A class – the third highest class – the same as the old C class?  
 
In addition to the general compliance issues, there are several characteristics of the design 
and implementation of labelling schemes which apply universally to all products. Of these, 
specific problems with implementation of the labelling schemes and classical reduced rate 
problems are most important.  
 
The ANEC (2007a) study documents some problems with the implementation of labelling 
on a product level. The main problems concern the quality of measurement due to the as-
sumptions in measurement methodologies and the allowed range of measurement tolerances.  
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The problem is more prevalent in cases when a product has different ‘modes of use’. For ex-
ample, a compact fluorescent light bulb operates in an on and off mode, therefore it is rela-
tively easy to measure energy consumption. A computer screen however has on, stand-by 
and off modes. Therefore, assumptions are necessary about the use of the on and standby 
modes. A photocopier has work, idle, standby, sleep and off (or more) modes, similarly 
washing machines have different programs with different energy uses. Measurement meth-
odologies must take these aspects of use into account, which can be subject to debate.  
 
Evidence in ANEC (2007) study shows large measurement tolerances which make it possible 
to classify a dishwashers and washing machines as A-class despite greater energy consump-
tion than that formally required by the class. This is possible due to the size of permitted 
measurement tolerances, whereby the product correctly labelled A despite the excess energy 
consumption. The implication is that the wrong products may be promoted by reduced 
VAT is some specific cases.  
2.6.  PROBLEMS WITH INCREASING DEMAND – REBOUND EFFECTS  
Promoting energy efficiency e.g. by means of the reduced VAT does not necessarily lead to 
lower emissions. Lower VAT functions to shift the stock of energy consuming appliances 
towards greater efficiency but this does not control for a rebound effect in terms of more use 
or more intensive use of these products – leading to more energy consumption and emis-
sions. 
 
Lower prices on energy efficient products increase the sales of energy efficient products and 
might also lower the share of the household budget that is devoted to the purpose of pur-
chasing energy-consuming products. The latter effect depends on effect pulling in different 
effects. On the one hand, the lower VAT rates reduced the costs of buying an en efficient 
energy using product. On the other hand, the more efficient products have an upfront pur-
chase before tax price premium that is often higher than the VAT reduction. 
 
However, the shift towards more energy efficient variants does not ensure that the consump-
tion of energy declines. This is because of the rebound effect. Lower prices of energy con-
suming products mean all other consumption, such as package holidays or garden furniture 
becomes relatively more expensive for the household. Therefore, the household substitutes 
part of its consumption of package holidays and garden furniture to buy more energy-
consuming products – because the price of energy consuming products is relatively lower. 
Because of this substitution, energy use and emissions may increase rather than decline. In 
other words, the lower VAT inducing the move from inefficient to more efficient does not 
control for the possibility that energy consumption decreases less than the improvement in 
energy efficiency. This is the essence of the rebound effect
20, represented by the vertical ar-
row in Figure 2.2. 
                                                           
20 If the improvement in energy efficiency leads to an increase in energy consumption, it is sometimes called a 




Figure 2.2 Illustration of the rebound effect 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics, Bertoldi and Atanasiu (2007), Eurostat (2008) 
 
The size of the rebound effect depends on the initial efficiency of the stock of energy con-
suming products prior to the promotion of energy efficiency through. In countries with a 
large share of energy inefficient products, the rebound effect from purchasing more energy 
efficient products is likely to be low. On the other hand, in countries where the stock of effi-
cient energy consuming products is high, lowering the price of these products is more likely 
to lead to more purchases, and therefore the rebound is more likely. It follows that in coun-
tries where energy efficient products already constitute a significant share of the stock, fur-
ther promotion of energy efficiency e.g. via VAT reductions is redundant. For example, in 
the Netherlands energy efficient boilers have a market penetration of about 90 per cent and 
hence a VAT reduction on such boilers would not have much effect on total energy con-
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Box 2.5 Penetration of energy efficient boilers in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands provides a case in point concerning the use of efficient condensing gas boilers. A signifi-
cant amount of Dutch households do not have access to district heating and operate private heating sys-
tems based on natural gas boilers. In the mid-80s, the predominant technology was the non-condensing 
boiler, reaching maximum efficiencies in the range of 60-70 per cent. The more efficient condensing gas 
boiler technology was used by a small amount of households, primarily because plumbers were reluctant to 
install the new technology due to lack of expertise. Following a national information campaign targeted at 
the plumbers, the installation of more efficient boilers increased dramatically, such that currently, the 
penetration of energy efficient boilers in the country is in the order of 90 per cent. The high rate of penetra-
tion means that further promotion of boiler energy efficiency via reduced VAT in the Netherlands is redun-
dant. 
Source: Bertoldi & Atanasiu (2007), Kemna  et al. (2007) 
 
In fact, the penetration rate of energy efficient products varies notably across the European 
Union, cf. Table 2.7. This of course makes the task of the policymaker more complicated 
since a VAT reduction might make sense in one country but not in another. Energy efficient 
freezers are, for instance, common in e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (red 
squares in the table) but not in e.g. Spain or Poland (green squares in table). 
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Table 2.7 Penetration rates of energy efficient products (rated A or better), per cent 
2006 
Country  Refrigerato
rs  Freezers  Washing 
Machines 
Dishwasher
s  Ovens  Domestic 
Lighting  Boilers 
Austria  55  59  80  75  59  15  33 
Belgium  78  76  96  95  61  10  16 
Czech R.  66  50  80  88  43  21  10 
Denmark  76  44  87  78  62  19  57 
Germany  68  70  96  78  60  20  49 
Estonia  68  4  75  78  39  2  9 
Greece  53  40  75  87  39  8  0 
Spain  37  7  63  69  23  8  0 
France  63  37  79  88  67  12  5 
Ireland  65  33  72  81  23  8  4 
Italy  53  40  75  87  39  4  5 
Cyprus  53  40  75  87  39  13  5 
Latvia  67  4  67  78  39  3  7 
Lithuan,  81  4  79  78  39  3  4 
Luxemb.  78  76  96  95  61  10  16 
Hungary  53  16  72  74  27  6  4 
Malta  39  11  60  70  32  7  0 
Netherla.  88  76  96  89  50  10  88 
Poland  61  4  79  78  39  3  8 
Portugal  39  11  60  70  32  15  0 
Slovenia  58  25  77  78  39  11  8 
Slovakia  69  44  70  78  39  7  15 
Finland  76  44  87  78  62  4  1 
Sweden  76  44  87  78  62  10  23 
United K  65  33  72  81  23  10  24 
Bulgaria  41  7  38  74  27  4  4 
Romania  52  2  54  74  27  2  4 
Note: High penetration (red) > 65%; Medium penetration (orange) 35%-65%; Low penetration (green) < 35% 
Penetration rate of efficient Domestic lighting regards CFL and penetration of efficient boilers regards condensing 
boilers. 
Source: Bertoldi & Atanasiu (2007), Kemna et al. (2007) 
 
Based upon a recent extensive survey on rebound effects, we would like to stress three con-
clusions in the context of the quantification of such rebound effects
21. The first conclusion is 
that existence of such rebound effects are well known from the empirical literature while at 
the same time subject to huge amount of discrepancy in terms of their magnitude.  
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The second conclusion is that rebound effect tends to be systematically downplayed in pol-




The third conclusion is that rebound effects from policy induced energy savings need to 
evaluated on a case-by-case and cannot be assumed to be in a specific narrow ex ante range. 
In this context, it is particularly important to make a distinction between to types of re-
bound effects.  
 
The first type of rebound is identified in the classical literature on rebound effects, where fo-
cus is on the effects of technology improvements that reduces the consumption of energy 
during the lifetime of product. The rebound effects come then from two sources: 
  Direct rebound: “the user costs” of cars, white goods etc. go down which through a 
relative price effect increases the demand for such products (“relative price” or 
“substitution effect) 
  Indirect effects: the technology progress that allows reduced energy consumption 
represents genuine net savings for consumer. Such savings will lead to increased 
demand some of which, depending o n inco me elasticity of such goods as cars, 
white goods, will go in the direction of energy using products (“income effect”). 
 
The review of rebound effect provides a very wide range of estimates for different type of 
household energy demand as well as confidence see Table 2.8. Rather than focusing on spe-
cific numbers, two qualitative issues are worth reminding. Consumers may react stronger 
over time to lower user costs with direct rebound. Moreover, rebound effects are larger when 
energy cost constitutes a larger part of total user costs, i.e. when running costs are important 
relative to purchase price.  So rebound effects from energy efficiency gains are larger for 
washing machines than for computers and higher in the EU than in the US due to higher 
energy prices in the former region
23. The review suggests that bringing in indirect effects as 
well, the total rebound may often exceed 50 per cent on an economy wide basis
24. 
 
                                                           
22 UKERC (2007), executive summary page 1: “In general, rebound effects have been neglected when assessing the 
potential impact of energy efficiency policies. A key conclusion of this report is that rebound effects are of sufficient 
importance to merit explicit treatment. Failure to take account of rebound effects could contribute to shortfalls in 
the achievement of energy and climate policy goals”. 
23 This suggest that studies focusing on the US market such as  Grenning et al (2000) would underestimate the size 
of rebound effects from technology progress driven energy savings in EU. 
24 UKERC(2007) page 88.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 2.8 Estimates of the long run direct rebound effect for consumer energy services 
in the OECD, in per cent 
End use  Range of values “Best guess”  No. of studies  Degree of confidence 
Personal automotive transport  5-87 10-30 17 High 
Space heating  2-60 10-30 9 Medium 
Space cooling  1-26 1-26 2 Low 
Other consumer energy services  0-49  Less than 20  3 Low 
Source: UKERC (2007), page 26 
 
The second type of rebound effects will be realised in the kind of policy experiment that this 
study is focused on and differs in several important aspects from the traditional rebound ef-
fects. While the rebound effect above comes from running costs being reduced, it is the pur-
chase price that is being affected here. Indeed, the whole rationale for policy experiment as 
explained in some detail in Section 2.2 that (some) consumers are more affected by up front 
economic incentives saving them funds here-and-now than on incentives working through 
the lifetime of the washing machine, boiler etc. Moreover, while energy savings in the tradi-
tional literature comes from technological progress saving energy, the effect of energy savings 
come from shifting the purchases towards energy efficient variants.  
 
 In short, it is a somewhat different set of parameters that determines the size of the rebound 
effect in this experiment relative to a situation with technology driven energy savings. We 
provide a numerical example of that in. Box 2.6, which shows that under certain conditions 
we can easily get rebound effects over 100 per cent with subsidy targeting efficient variants 
of energy using products (“backfire”) where a more traditional technology improvement af-
fecting the same energy using product would lead to clear energy savings.  
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Box 2.6 Classical and purchase price driven rebound effects 
The classical rebound effect is driven by increased technological progress, increasing energy efficiency. The 
reduced user costs that are due to the increased energy efficiency encourage increased use of the energy con-
suming good. Studies from western European countries show that this rebound effect is often substantial, 
cf. Table 2.6 above.  
 
The rebound effect that would stem from a reduced VAT rate would be of a different kind. The increased av-
erage energy efficiency would be due to a shift from the use of inefficient products towards the use of effi-
cient products. The prices would have to be reduced in order to achieve the same increase in average energy 
efficiency. In most cases this price reduction would result in a larger reduction in user cost and hence cause a 
larger rebound effect.  
 
The rebound effects estimated in the literature on classical rebound should therefore be viewed as a lower 
boundary for the expected rebound effect in this study. 
 
The difference between the two drivers of rebound effect is illustrated below, where we provide a hypotheti-
cal example based on freezers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
 
As to the classical rebound, imagine that all freezers would become more energy efficient so that their en-
ergy consumption would drop 5%. This increase in energy efficiency would render user costs to drop 2-3% 
depending on energy price and discount rate. 
 
We now turn to the price driven rebound effect and calculate which price cut would lead to a 5% drop in en-
ergy consumption. In order to test the strength of our hypothesis, we assume consumers to be extremely 
price sensitive with respect to the choice between energy efficient and inefficient goods. We apply a substi-
tution elasticity of 4 between efficient and inefficient goods.  
 
We find that the user cost would have to be reduced by 17% and 26% in The United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands, respectively. Note that this would require a price reduction beyond the scope of what is feasible 
through VAT reductions, cf. table below. 
 
Cost reductions necessary to reduce energy consumption by 5%, discount rate 5% 
  Reduction in user cost  Reduction in purchase price 
The Netherlands  26%  54% 
The United Kingdom  17%  28% 
 
A reduction in user cost in the range of 17-26% would naturally render a much larger rebound effect than a 
reduction in user cost of 2-3%. We draw the conclusion that, given a reduction in energy consumption, the 
price driven rebound effect is stronger than the classical rebound effect. 
 
Larger user cost reduction gives a larger rebound effect. Our rebound is therefore expected to be even larger 
than the survey benchmark. 
Note:  Assumptions underlying the calculation; energy price UK €0,166 energy price NL € 0,283: life expectancy 
11 years: difference in energy consumption between efficient and inefficient freezers 106 kWh/year: differ-
ence in purchase price between efficient and inefficient€ 267 in UK and € 106 in NL. 
Source: EU Commission (2007), IVM (2008), NAHB/Bank of America (2007), Energy EU (2008) and IEA 
(2007).   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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CASE STUDY:  VAT RATES ON PESTICIDES, FERTILISERS AND ORGANIC FOOD 
 
The primary objective of this study is to review the role that VAT rate policy can play rela-
tive to environmental objectives. In this small case study we review in this perspective also 
VAT rates on pesticides, fertilisers and organic food but with the added element that the 
present use of reduced rates on pesticides and fertilisers have their motivation in other con-
cerns such as reducing production costs for small farming in particular.  
 
The case study then addresses the following three questions: 
•  Is reduced VAT rates on fertilisers and pesticides a cost-effective instrument to help 
small scale farming in view of alternative instruments an? 
•  Should reduced VAT rates on fertilisers and pesticides be restricted to ‘environ-
mentally friendly’ plant protection chemicals, e.g. defined according to their low 
toxicity – taxing the remaining chemicals at the standard rat 
•  Is reduced VAT on organic foodstuffs – taxing the remaining foodstuffs at the 
standard rate – an effective instrument to encourage health and environmental ob-
jective 
 
Reduced rates on pesticides and fertilisers to boost incomes in (small scale) farming 
For most industries, a reduced VAT rate on inputs has no impact on income and output 
prices for the industry, as normally the input VAT is deductible from the output VAT. So 
there is no profit gain for the enterprises and not price gain for the consumer. 
 
However, normally smaller and specialist farmers, have in a number of countries the option 
to operate within a special VAT system, under which they do not pay VAT on outputs, but 
are also not able to reclaim the VAT on inputs, cf. table 1. The system, however, provides 
flat-rate compensation for the “lost” VAT on inputs25. This compensation often de facto ex-
ceeds the “lost” VAT: a recent OECD surveys identified 8 countries with such special treat-
ment schemes for farmers cf. Table 2.9. In such cases it is possible that farmers also benefit 
from reduced rates on input such as pesticides and fertilizers. However, the effect of this 
should be zero or very small as this VAT should normally be part of the flat-rate compensa-
tion as last mentioned.  
                                                           
25 OECD (2005), p. 121, contains a comprehensive summary of the special provisions member states apply for the 
VAT treatment of inputs to and outputs from agriculture. The simplified VAT system allows farmers to operate 
with simplified bookkeeping which means that they do not charge VAT on outputs, but are also not able to reclaim 
VAT on inputs. Instead, they receive compensation – in different forms – for the VAT paid on inputs. According to 
OECD (2005), in many member states the simplified system overcompensates the farmers, de facto offering a sub-
sidy.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 2.9: Special VAT treatment of farmers vs. reduced VAT on fertilizers/pesticides 
VAT on fertilizers and/or pesticides   
Standard  Reduced 
Not available  Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Sweden  Austria  Special VAT 
treatment of 
farmers  Available  Netherlands, United Kingdom  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,  Italy, 
Ireland 
Note: Subsample of 13 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Sweden, France, Nether-
lands, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, OECD (2005), DG TAXUD (2008) 
 
So farmers applying the special VAT scheme benefit (partly) from reduced rates on pesti-
cides and fertilisers in a number of countries. Within the EU, at least 6 countries combine 
these two options creating such effects cf. table 1, namely the countries marked with red. 
 
We would, however, question whether reduced VAT on specific inputs – to the extent there 
would be a benefit for farmers anyway – is an effective way to support small scale farming. 
First, some of the benefits will be harvested by private consumers not only small scale farm-
ing. Second, the subsidy size for the individual small farmer is linked to the level of their 
consumption of these two products not the specific criteria that may have justified the sub-
sidy such as low income generation, soil conditions, regional employment aims in remote ru-
ral areas etc. Thirdly, the budgetary support is highly non-transparent with the effect being a 
combination of being outside the standard VAT system and the size of the VAT reduction. 
Fourthly, it may raise standard compliance costs issues such as qualifying what exactly con-
stitute a fertilisers or pesticide. Fifthly, it may create standard distortions relative to other 
standard rated inputs that may have the same effects on productivity etc.  
 
Sixthly, there may an internal market dimension although it is likely to minor. First, small 
farmers constitute only a small part of the farming sector, implying that the cost reductions 
from reduced rates on pesticides and fertilisers should have only a smaller impact on the 
market. Second, direct effect on consumer purchase decisions must be absolutely limited as 
consumers do not do a lot of “cross-border” shopping for food. 
 
In policy terms, a standard rate could be combined with a number of other instruments that 
would deliver the same objectives in terms of job/income creation in the specific sector 
namely agriculture or preferably by some other instrument that was not industry specific. So 
even the direct effect on jobs and growth from such an adjustment may well be zero.  
 
Reduced rates only on less toxic variants of pesticides and fertilisers 
A possible variant of having standard rates on all pesticides and fertilisers, is to promote less 
toxic chemicals by keeping them reduced rated – while punishing the use of toxic fertilizers 
with the standard rate. We see two main problems with this approach. 
   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Firstly, according to OECD (2007), pollution from pesticide or fertilizer misuse is localised 
– e.g. more significant in certain regions of e.g. Netherlands, Denmark or the UK, – so it 
needs to be addressed in the precise areas where it is a problem. VAT is not geographically 
constrained; therefore it will fail to fully bring in the required effects in the relevant areas.  
Because of its general geographic incidence, reduced VAT may also create adverse incentives 
e.g. to avoid fertilizer or plant protection chemical use in areas or cases where their increased 
use is rational – e.g. in farms achieving high yields. A tax scheme can target the root cause of 
the problem more directly. For example, in Denmark – in addition to taxing fertilizer pur-
chases with a dedicated tax – there are limits on nutrient concentration in soils for individual 
farms – to prevent fertilizer misuse. The system has been effective in meeting the target of 
decreasing the so called ‘nitrogen surplus’ without affecting the level of agricultural produc-
tion.  
 
Secondly, the environmental cost of pollution from fertilizers or plant protection chemicals 
increases exponentially with their misuse. Once the nutrient or a protective chemical con-
centration exceeds a certain threshold, it no l o n g e r  i n c r e a s e s  c r o p  y i e l d s  b u t  p o l l u t e s  
groundwater, drinking water sources, causes eutrophication and other pollution, cf. OECD 
(2007). In contrast to specific taxes, the VAT is not able to punish misuse of fertilizer in 
production stronger than its correct use. In Denmark, farms exceeding limits of nutrient 
concentration in soils are subject to heavy fines – on top of the tax already paid for fertilizers 
and pesticides use. The thresholds are set to prevent nutrient leaching whose likelihood var-
ies between agricultural produce and local conditions, such as soil fertility or climate condi-
tions. Because the Danish tax scheme works on the farm level, it is able to take local speci-
ficities into account – and punish misuse accordingly. A reduced VAT on organic food, on 
the other hand, cannot guarantee a similar degree of precision in punishing the specific pol-
luters.  
 
Reduced VAT rates for organic food for environmental reasons 
An alternative to taxing input chemicals is to give VAT advantages to organic food. Organic 
foodstuffs are produced according to standards defining – among other things – maximum 
levels of use of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals – chosen to limit environmental 
pollution. Currently, no countries identify organic foodstuffs in their VAT systems.26 How-
ever, there are both practical and more general problems with this approach. At the practical 
level, most foodstuffs are often reduced rated in EU with some exceptions for processed 
foods in some member states.  
 
Taxing foodstuffs with the reduced VAT already creates an implementation problem. To 
promote organic foodstuffs, it follows that either a reduction to a super-reduced or zero 
VAT would be necessary – or an increase of the non-organic food rate to the standard level. 
Reductions to super reduced or zero will bring about relatively low price differentials because 
of the relatively small differences between reduced rates and super-reduced or zero rates. The 
retail price differential favouring organic foodstuffs are too small for farmers to justify a shift 
to organic farming.  
 
                                                           
26 Italy uses a reduced rate on inputs to organic agriculture.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Increasing the VAT on non-organic foodstuffs to the standard level may bring about larger 
price differentials. But it will also be more difficult to reconcile with income distributional 
objectives – the reason why many member states apply the reduced rates on foodstuffs in the 
first place. The basic general problem will remain the fact documented above that the nega-
tive impact is highly associated with its use on a very local level which VAT rate policy can 
be definition not address.  
 
There are other problems, in addition. Several national case studies documented in OECD 
(2007) give support to the intuition that especially VAT reductions on organic foodstuffs are 
ineffective in addressing the root cause of pollution in agriculture stemming from misuse of 
plant protection chemicals or fertilizers For example; organic wheat can be processed into 
relatively inexpensive organic flour or relatively expensive organic bread. With a generic 
VAT reduction on organic food, a client buying a kilo of organic bread will save more Euros 
than a client buying a kilo of organic flour. But the higher saving on bread may not necessar-
ily be justified by larger environmental benefits from the avoided use of pollutants in making 
a kilo of organic bread. The larger saving from reduced VAT on bread may be due to the 
fact that a lot of value is added by the use of expensive distribution channels, for example. 
However, a client may react stronger to the larger monetary decline in prices, and therefore 
increase the consumption of bread – leading to more production of bread – and diminishing 
environmental benefits.  
 
Another related aspect of the ad valorem nature of the VAT is that high income consumers 
buying more expensive bread will benefit more than lower income consumers buying less 
expensive bread. Thus, the low income consumers are likely to bear the burden of reducing 
the VAT on both varieties of bread. 
 
Reduced rates for organic food to encourage a healthy lifestyle 
According to the WHO, overweight and obesity contribute to a number of diseases, includ-
ing diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and cancer.27 Unhealthy nutrition habits are more preva-
lent in low income, low education groups, in rural settings. A study by DG Health and Con-
sumers established that wrong nutrition habits become a key cause of preventable deaths, 
currently on par with but set to outpace smoking soon.28 Can reduced VAT on healthy 
foods be used to promote a healthy lifestyle to reduce the societal cost of disease treatment? 
In principle, reduced VAT can be used to promote ‘healthy foods’ such as fruit or vegetables, 
while standard VAT can punish ‘unhealthy foods’ such as sugars or fast-food. Indeed, UK 
and France already use differentiated VAT on foodstuffs applying the standard rate on 
highly processed foods, such as ready meals, chocolate or ice cream, while using the reduced 
or zero on the rest.  
                                                           
27 WHO (2008); http://www.who.int/topics/obesity/en/ 




But according to Dejgård Jensen (2007), there is no guarantee that reduced VAT automati-
cally translates into to a healthy lifestyle, although it may somewhat contribute to it. Re-
duced VAT may increase consumption of healthy foods overall, but it is less effective in tar-
geting the socio-demographic, income or geographic groups with poor dietary habits. Fur-
thermore, reduced VAT on healthy foods does not diminish consumption of unhealthy 
foods. Furthermore, the VAT does not affect other aspects of a healthy lifestyle, such as exer-
cise. Finally, economic costs of reduced VAT on healthy food will be skewed across social 
groups since those with unhealthy nutrition habits will bear larger costs. 
 
Denver and Smed (2004) using data on foodstuff consumption of 2000 Danish households 
in 1997-2000, document that VAT reductions change dietary habits in the desired way, al-
though fall short of affecting the groups with the worst habits to a sufficient degree29. Re-
duced VAT does increase consumption of vegetables and fruits. But reduced VAT is not ef-
fective in promoting all types of healthy foods, e.g. fish and poultry. Reduced VAT may also 
lead to unintended increase in consumption of unhealthy foods, such as sugar, in which case 
it is recommended to tax their consumption. Therefore, the study concludes that a combina-
tion of reduced VAT and taxes targeting unhealthy foods is the most effective economic in-
strument in achieving the objective of greater consumption of healthy foodstuffs across dif-
ferent groups. 
 
However, even such a combination system may be difficult to implement in practice. Firstly, 
a clear distinction between healthy and unhealthy foods will be necessary at the right level of 
aggregation, which is complicated and costly. For example, should consumption of sweet po-
tatoes containing more carbohydrate calories – on health grounds – be punished vis-à-vis 
regular potatoes?30. Moreover, even if sugar becomes punished with a standard VAT, the 
price of sugar containing foods may increase by an amount insignificant to produce any 
changes in consumer behaviour. The VAT structure may also give incentives to adjust con-
tents of processed foods in a way to gain the subsidy while not necessarily improving their 
dietary characteristics. Furthermore, according to Dejgård Jensen (2007) taxes on unhealthy 
foods may increase consumption of untaxed unhealthy foods – thus all foods will need to be 
taxed – possibly leading to less customer choice. Finally, distribution of economic costs will 
be skewed as high income households consuming more e.g. expensive organic truffles are 
likely to benefit from VAT reductions to a larger degree than low income households pur-
chasing cheaper organic carrots.  
 
The overarching conclusion from the literature review is that the use of reduced VAT does 
bring about changes in the structure of foodstuffs consumption but may not be an effective 
in achieving health objectives. Nor is reduced VAT alone an efficient way to do it.   
 
                                                           
29 Alternatively, the groups consuming healthy  
30 One possibility to improve the precision of the VAT is to promote ‘healthy substances’ such as fibre with reduced 
VAT, while using standard VAT to punish ‘unhealthy substances’ such as sugars, cholesterol, or saturated fats – in-
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The purpose of the chapter is to assess overall effects that the changes in VAT rates related to 
energy consumption and energy consuming products may have, on energy consumption and 
income distribution as well as VAT revenues. In section 3.1, we define the two main types of 
scenarios investigated in this study and the model used to review effects. In section 3.2, we 
describe the effects of the removal of VAT rate reductions on the consumption of heating 
and electricity on energy consumption, public finances and the distribution of income. In 
section 3.3, we describe the environmental and income distribution effects of a mandatory 
EU-wide reduction in VAT rates on energy efficient goods.  
3.1.  SCENARIOS FOR VAT RATE CHANGES AND MODEL USED 
To analyse the national effects, as well as internal market aspects of differentiation of VAT 
rates, we have defined a number of scenarios of possible changes to the present set of con-
figuration of VAT rates in member states, which reflect more general options as well as more 
specific changes that member states have put forward or considered, either nationally or in 
the context of EU as discussed in preface and summary of findings.  
 
In this chapter we analyse two scenarios or policy options in which the VAT is changed in 
order to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gasses.  
 
Removal of VAT reductions on energy In scenario 1, all EU countries remove all present 
VAT reductions on the use of heating and electricity and replace them by the country spe-
cific standard rate. Currently VAT reductions on the use of heating and electricity can be 
found in many countries of the European Union, and often the VAT rates on heating and 
electricity are markedly lower than the standard VAT rate. For example, in UK the VAT rate 
on heating consumption is 5.25 per cent, while the standard VAT rate is 17.5 per cent. 
 
Mandatory VAT reductions for environmental friendly goods In scenario 2 all European 
Union countries reduce the VAT rate on environmental friendly goods, which are energy ef-
ficient household appliances, energy efficient consumer electronics, energy efficient boilers 
and organic foodstuffs. This results in an EU-wide VAT rate for these goods of 5 per cent.  
 
The change in VAT rates in each of the scenarios is different for the different countries of 
the European Union. First, the countries have different standard rates, so when e.g. the VAT 
rate on consumption of heating and electricity is set to standard rate it implies different lev-
els for the countries. Second, in the case of scenario 1 the countries have widely differing 
starting points, because they charge different VAT rates on energy consumption, and be-
cause the VAT rate on energy consumption is often different for consumption of heating 
and electricity. 
 
Chapter 3  OVERALL RESULTS ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND 
PUBLIC FINANCES    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Note:  VAT changes are measured in absolute values or percentage points. The average is a simple average across 
the countries of EU27. “Max” means “maximum”, “Avg” means “Average”, “Min” means “minimum”. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
Scenario 1 has the highest differences between countries in the VAT changes cf. figure 3.1. 
These range from 0 to 14 percentage points as some countries do not have any reductions on 
the VAT for energy goods, while others have large reductions. However, scenario 1 also has 
the lowest average VAT change of the scenarios. Scenario 2 has the highest average VAT 
change for all the European Union, but still with a large variation. 
The computable general equilibrium model 
In order to take into account all the factors which affect energy consumption, we have de-
veloped a model Europe; a mathematical model of the European economy specifically con-
structed to provide insights into the best choice of VAT rates in Europe. The model is called 
the Copenhagen Economics VAT Model (CEVM) and it encompasses a detailed description 
of the economies of the 27 member states in 2008, including a very detailed representation 
of the current VAT structure, cf. Box 1. The CEV-model can be used to simulate how the 
European economy would react to changes in the VAT system, and on this basis we can cal-
culate the change in energy consumption. 
 
The CEV-model has an economic structure and an economic motor that together determine 
the outcome of the simulations we are going to conduct. 
 
The model has eight sectors which represent all economic activity of the European countries. 
They have been set up to focus attention on the goods targeted for derogations. Thus, in the 
model there is a separate economic sector producing e.g. boilers, fossil fuels and household 




The economic motor is a classical global, multi-sectoral, general equilibrium framework cap-
turing both the direct effects on sectors targeted by VAT changes and the indirect effects on 
their suppliers, consumers and competitors. Price elasticities are different between sectors 
and chosen on the basis of a literature search. 
 
Box 3.1 Modelling differentiated VAT rates 
The CEVM is a global, multi-regional, multi-sector, general equilibrium model, and is specially designed to 
study the economic effects of VAT policies. The model captures all linkages between the different sectors 
of the economy, and it therefore allows for an economy-wide assessment of VAT policies. Specifically, the 
model captures both the direct effects on sectors targeted by the specific policy, and the indirect effects on 
their suppliers, consumers and competitors. Therefore, the model is suitable for answering a question such 
as how large is the total economic cost of a VAT reduction when taking into account all spillover effects.  
 
The model represents all current 27 EU Member States. The rest of the world is aggregated into a single re-
gion labelled Rest of the World. Each of the regions has a representative consumer, a government and a 
production sector for each of the 8 sectors included.  
 
The households in the model economy consume a group of energy goods, which are subdivided into energy 
efficient and non-energy efficient goods. These energy goods are household appliances, consumer electron-
ics, boilers and other energy goods. As input to these goods, the households also consume fossil fuels and 
electricity. 
 
Besides, model households consume non-energy goods in the form of food, which can be organic or non-
organic, and other goods. 
 
The GTAP database, version 6, provides the majority of the data for the empirical implementation of the 
model. The database is the best and most updated source of internally consistent data on production, con-
sumption and international trade by country and sector, and is based on detailed national accounts and 
balance of payments data from both national sources and international organisations. The CEVM therefore 
draws directly on the state-of-the-art in global databases for general equilibrium analysis. 
 
Assumptions about the degree of substitutability between energy efficient and non-efficient appliances 
become crucial for both the direction and size of the effects. We have looked through the related literature 
to find plausible estimates of the key parameters. Based on this search, we find it reasonable to assume 
that the substitution elasticity between energy efficient and non-energy efficient goods is in the 
neighbourhood of 3. A specific set of experiences, which lend support to this assumption, was found from 
the Polish IFC/GEF efficient lighting project, where fluorescent light bulbs were subsidized to help market 
penetration of these more energy efficient light bulbs.
31 
 
Similarly, the assumed elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy goods is crucial for the re-
sponse of total energy consumption to changing average prices of energy goods. We assume in line with 
the literature that the substitution elasticity is 0.8 (see Conrad and Löschel (2005)). 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
Avoiding technical issues, the following features of the calculations are worth underlining: 
 
  We are measuring long term effects.  
 
  We assume full pass-through of VAT changes to prices in all sectors. This stems 
mainly from two conclusions. First we find this to be by far the most likely reaction 
in most industries in a long term perspective as discussed in Copenhagen Econom-
ics (2007). Secondly, we do not possess sufficiently precise information to allow us 
to define different levels of pass-through with any reasonable certainty. 
                                                           




  The chosen balancing of public finances, when changing individual VAT rates, is 
an adjustment of the standard VAT. There are two reasons for this. First, it clarifies 
that the central issue here is the net benefit of having higher or lower VAT across 
different goods and services. Adjusting by way of income taxes, lump sump trans-
fers etc. raises larger issues about the most appropriate tax structure and the rela-
tions between parts of the tax system which lie beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
 
  None of the standard VAT rates can be below 15 per cent in the scenarios. For 
countries where this is the case the standard VAT rate is set to 15 per cent. 
3.2.   SCENARIO 1: STANDARD RATES ON HEATING AND ELECTRICITY 
In the following, we first describe the trade-off between achieving income distribution and 
environmental objectives by changing the VAT rate. Then we present a typology of Euro-
pean Union countries according to their present usage of VAT reductions for energy con-
sumption. Finally, we present results of implementing scenario 1 on energy consumption 
and the distribution of income. 
 
Income distribution concerns are important reasons why many countries of the European 
Union apply reduced VAT rates to energy consumption. Energy is consumed in almost 
equal quantities by both low and high income households in the European Union. There-
fore VAT on energy consumption places a relatively larger economic burden on low income 
households than on high income households, and a reduction in VAT on energy consump-
tion can help achieve objectives of a more equal distribution of incomes. 
 
On the other hand reduced VAT on energy consumption is a stimulus to the consumption 
of energy, resulting in higher consumption of energy and increased emissions of greenhouse 
gasses. Hence, a reduced VAT on energy consumption works against the achievement of en-
vironmental objectives of the individual countries and of the European Union. 
 
Finally, reduced VAT rates on energy consumption has a range of other effects in terms of 
administrative burdens for the tax authorities and reduced innovation activity in the area of 
environmental friendly products. 
 
It is useful to group the countries of the European Union according to their use of reduced 
VAT on energy consumption because the effects of scenario 1 are different for the groups, cf. 
Table 3.1.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 3.1 Country groups according to use of reduced VAT 
  Reduced VAT on electricity con-
sumption 
No reduced VAT on electricity 
consumption 
Reduced VAT on heating consumption  Group C: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, United King-
dom 
Group A: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary 
No reduced VAT on heating consump-
tion 
Group B: Malta  Group D: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slova-
kia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
Scenario 1 can be expected to lead to a reduction in total energy consumption in the EU. 
This is because energy consumption either in the form of heating or electricity consumption 
becomes more expensive, which makes households reduce their consumption of energy. 
 
The effects of scenario 1 on the consumption of the components of energy, electricity and 
heating, depend the absolute change in the VAT rates on electricity and heating in the dif-
ferent countries, and the change in the size of the VAT rate on heating relative to the VAT 
rate on electricity. The absolute increase in the VAT rate leads to reduced consumption of 
heating or electricity. On the other hand, the change in the relative VAT rates may lead to 
an increase in the consumption of either heating or electricity. That is because heating and 
electricity are to some extent substitutes, and if e.g. the VAT rate on electricity increases 
much more than the VAT rate on heating, the consumption of fossil fuels for heating may 
increase. An intuitive reasoning is linked to the fact that electricity can indeed be used for 
heating. 
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the changes in the absolute VAT rates and the relative VAT rates. For 
example, in country group C the VAT rate on electricity relative to the VAT rate on heating 
increases. 
 
Table 3.2 VAT changes by country group in scenario 1, percentage points 
Average reduction in VAT, percentage 
points  Country group  Standard rate, per cent 
Heating  Electricity 
A  19.4  2.5  - 
B  18.0  -  13.0 
C  18.6  9.8  11.0 
D  20.4  -  - 
EU average  19.5  3.8  3.3 
Note: The results presented in this table relate to scenario 1, where VAT reductions on heating and electricity are 
removed. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
The change of VAT rates has important effects which go beyond the markets for electricity 
and heating. 
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One important such general equilibrium effect comes through the balancing of the public 
budget: When the VAT rates on electricity and heating are increased, public revenue in-
creases, allowing for increased public expenditure or lower taxes in other areas. Based on the 
considerations in Copenhagen Economics (2007) we assume that the increased VAT reve-
nue is used to lower the standard VAT rate. The reduced standard VAT rate primarily leads 
to higher consumption of non-energy goods, but may also lead to an increase in the con-
sumption of energy goods. 
 
Another important general equilibrium effect is that the decrease in households’ energy con-
sumption leads to a reduction in the price of fuel. This is likely to increase the demand for 
fuel by industry, including power generation but also to improve current account position of 
the EU.  
Effects of scenario 1 on energy consumption 
Country groups A and C, which implement the VAT increases in scenario 1, experience a 
decline in energy consumption cf. Table 3.3. The countries of group C implement the larg-
est VAT increases and experience the largest declines in energy consumption. The average ef-
fect on the entire EU is a decline in energy consumption of 0.8 per cent. 
  
Table 3.3 Effects on household energy consumption, 2008, per cent 
Country group  Effects on  energy consumption 
A  -0.8 
B  - 
C  -1.4 
D  0.0 
EU average  -0.8 
Note: The results presented in this table relate to scenario 1, where VAT reductions on heating and electricity are 
removed. The results in the table concern only electricity and heating. No effects are estimated for Malta 
due to lack of data. Note: The results have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable gen-
eral equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
 
The size of the effects is sensitive to the assumed substitutability between energy goods and 
non-energy goods. The more consumers are willing to substitute non-energy goods for en-
ergy goods, the greater will be the effect of scenario 1 VAT derogations on energy consump-
tion, and vice versa. An important parameter here is the so-called “elasticity of substitution” 
between energy goods and non-energy goods. In our main scenarios this elasticity is set to 
0.8. If it were changed to 0.3, the effect of scenario 1 on energy consumption would be a de-
crease of 0.3 percent. 
Distributional effects 
Low income groups will experience a worsening of their household budgets, while high in-
come families will gain. This is because energy accounts for a larger share of the budget in 
low income quintiles than in the high income quintiles. On average, in the EU27 the lowest 
income quintile spends 1.5 percent more on energy than the highest income quintile, cf.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 3.4. Therefore the direct effect of higher VAT on energy consumption is likely to be a 
relatively greater increase of household expenditure for poor households. 
 











District  heating  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.5 
Electricity 2.1  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.4  1.6 
Gas 1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.6  1.7 
Heating oil  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  1.7 
Solid fuel  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2  1.6 
Transport  fuel  2.1 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.3 0.7 
Total energy, net of 
transport fuel  4.8 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.0 1.6 
Note: Per cent of total household expenditure. COICOP structure of household expenditure, 2005. Czech Repub-
lic excluded due to lack of data. Quintile 1 is the poorest / Quintile 5 is the richest. Countries are weighted 
by size of final household expenditure.  
Source: Eurostat and Copenhagen Economics.  
 
The actual effects confirm that the incidence of VAT increases is largest on the lowest in-
come quintiles, although the absolute size of the effects is small. In the group of countries 
with a reduced rate on energy used for heating, the loss of the lowest income quintile is 
about 8 times the gain of the richest quintile household. The same ratio of losses to gains in 
the groups of countries with reduced VAT on electricity and both electric and heat energy is 
about 4. The average for the EU26 is only about 3.5, since a significant number of countries 
do not have reduced VAT on energy and therefore the scenario has no effects in these coun-
tries.  
 
The small size of the effect is partly due to the small initial shares of energy consumption e.g. 
relative to expenditures on food, and partly due to the gains from the reductions in the stan-
dard VAT rates which are required by the assumption of a balanced public budget.  
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Table 3.5 Removal of reduced VAT on energy 
Income quintile 
Country 
group  Quintile1 
(lowest income)
Quintile2  Quintile3  Quintile4 
Quintile5 
(highest income)
A 0.02 0.02  0.00  -0.01 -0.03 
B  - - - - - 
C 0.05  0.06  0.03  -0.01  -0.12 
D  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU 27 average 
(unweighted)  0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01  -0.05 
Note:  For each country group we calculate the difference in the percentage change in COICOP consumption ex-
penditure between the poorest and richest income quintile households. Czech Republic is excluded due to 
lack of data. Country group A encompasses Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany and Hungary. 
Group B contains Malta. Group C encompasses Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, and 
United Kingdom. Group D contains the remaining EU27. The values are to be interpreted as the percent-
age change in consumption expenditure under a given scenario relative to the baseline. A positive value in-
dicates an increase in consumption expenditures relative to baseline. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
VAT revenue effects 
Scenario 1 results in increased VAT revenues for the countries that raise VAT rates on elec-
tricity and heating, c.f. table 3.6. The effects are between one and approx. three per cent in-
crease in VAT revenue. The revenue gain is largest in group C where the absolute VAT 
change is the largest. 
 
Table 3.6 VAT revenue gains with removal of rate reductions on energy consumption 
Country group 
Aggregate VAT revenue gain 
(€ million) 
VAT revenue gain, percent-
age change relative to base-
line VAT revenue 
VAT revenue gain, percent-
age of GDP 
A 454  0.14%  0.01% 
B  - - - 
C 2944  1.18%  0.08% 
D 0  0.00%  0.00% 
EU aggregate  3398  0.64%  0.03% 
Note: The total effect captures the changes in VAT revenue as a result of the VAT rate changes in scenario as well as 
the dynamic adjustment in VAT bases due to substitution between heat and electric energy and away from 
energy consumption into the rest of the economy. The total effect is calculated as a percentage increase over 
the benchmark VAT revenue. 1.18% means that VAT revenue increases due to the Scenario, prior to rebal-
ancing the public budget. No effects are calculated for Malta due to lack of data. Note: The results have 
been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Eurostat. 
3.3.  SCENARIO 2: REDUCED RATES ON ENERGY EFFICENT ENERGY USING PROD-
UCTS 
In this subchapter we review the effects on energy consumption from applying reduced rates 
to energy efficient goods reviewing effects mainly on energy consumption and public reve-
nues. 




We first review the effects on domestic boilers used for heating.  The change in VAT rates 
affects heating consumption in two ways: 
 
  The within group effect 
  The rebound effect (or between group effect) 
 
The within group effect refers to the change in the share of energy efficient boilers out of the 
total market for boilers. The direction of the within group effect in isolation is generally a 
lower heating consumption, because for a given total consumption of boilers, an increase in 
the market share of energy efficient variants leads to a decline in heating consumption. The 
size of the within group effect depends on four things, i) the substitutability between energy 
efficient boilers and conventional boilers – the substitution elasticity, c.f.  
Box 3.1, ii) the market share of energy efficient boilers prior to the VAT derogations, iii) the 
difference in energy consumption per unit of energy efficient boiler relative to the energy 
consumption of a conventional boiler and iv) the size of the VAT change. 
 
The rebound effect refers to the change in the consumption share of energy goods relative to 
other consumption groups when the average price of energy goods changes. The direction of 
the rebound effect in isolation is to increase heating consumption. The size of the rebound 
effect depends on i) the substitutability between energy goods and other consumption 
groups, ii) the consumption share of energy goods, iii) energy goods’ share of total energy 
consumption and iv) the size of the VAT change. We have already in chapter 2 discussed 
why the rebound effect from this type of policy experiment may be larger than orders of 
magnitude from the rebound that follows from technological progress that enhances energy 
efficiency of different product groups. 
 
To assess the importance of the market share of energy efficient boilers prior to the VAT 
derogations it is useful to classify the European Union countries according to this initial 
market share. 
 
Table 3.7 Classifying EU-countries for the heating analysis 
Grouping according to market share of efficient boilers 
Group 1, first quartile: Swe-
den, United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, Germany, Denmark, the 
Netherlands 
Group 2, second quartile: 
Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Belgium, Luxembourg 
Group 3, third quartile: 
Romania, Ireland, Lithuania, 
France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia 
Group 4, fourth quartile: 
Malta, Portugal, Spain,  
Greece, Finland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria 
Note: Malta and Portugal have a share of efficient boilers=0, as no division between efficient and non-efficient boil-
ers exists.  
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
The countries of the European Union overall have relatively low market shares of energy ef-
ficient boilers. This implies that for small absolute reduction in the VAT rate of energy effi-
cient boilers the change in the number of energy efficient boilers will be small and the de-
cline in the number of conventional boilers will be large. The net effect of this change on   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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heating consumption depends on the energy efficiency of the two groups of boilers and the 
size of the VAT change. 
 
Table 3.8 Characteristics of the country groups  
Country group 
Average in group, market 
share, per cent 
Average in group, consump-
tion share of boilers, per cent 
Energy consumption of en-
ergy efficient variant rela-
tive to conventional variant, 
per cent 
Group 1  46  0.6  76 
Group 2  12  1.3  87 
Group 3  5  0.6  88 
Group 4  2  0.5  88 
Note: Note: Malta and Portugal are excluded in Market share average as there is no division between efficient and 
non-efficient boilers in these countries. Malta is excluded in consumption share. The shares are denoted in 
percentage of volume.   
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
The energy efficient boilers in the European Union countries are generally about 10 per cent 
to 25 per cent more energy efficient than conventional boilers. On the other hand, for the 
Netherlands, energy efficient boilers are about twice as energy efficient as conventional boil-
ers. This is smaller than is the case for household appliances and consumer electronics, c.f. 
next subsection. In isolation this lessens the expected effect of the VAT derogation on heat-
ing consumption. 
 
Finally, the size of the VAT change is generally large. This serves to magnify the expected 
reduction in the heating consumption. 
 
The different factors which determine the size of the rebound effect have different implica-
tions for the size of the rebound effect. Energy goods constitute a relatively small part of the 
total consumption; hence the total quantity of energy goods will only increase a little in re-
sponse to a VAT change. On the other hand, the share of energy consumption by energy 
goods is very high, which works to ensure a large rebound effect. The large change in the 
VAT rate also works to ensure a large rebound effect. 
 
Scenario 2 leads to a reduction in the total heating consumption in the EU, c.f. Table 3.9. 
The reductions are largest in the Netherlands and Denmark. In the case of group 1, which 
includes among others the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, the relatively large VAT 
reduction in combination with a high initial market share of energy efficient boilers appears 
to drive the large effects. On the other hand, in group two the low market share of energy ef-
ficient goods means that the effect is smaller than in group 1, even though the VAT decrease 
is larger. In group 3 the effect is smaller than in group 1 and 2 because of a smaller VAT re-
duction and a smaller market share of efficient goods.  
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Table 3.9 VAT change and effects on heating consumption in scenario 2 
Country group  Average VAT change , percentage 
points 
Effects on heating consumption, 
percentage change 
Group 1  14.3  -2.8 
Group 2  15.6  -1.8 
Group 3  12.6  -0.9 
Group 4  13.5  -0.9 
Note: Bulgaria, Malta and Romania excluded in VAT change due to lack of data. The results have been obtained 
using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
 
The results in Table 3.9 are sensitive to assumptions made about consumers’ willingness to 
substitute energy efficient variants of boilers for conventional variants, and on the willing-
ness to substitute energy goods for non-energy goods. The substitution elasticities which un-
derlie the results presented in this report are 0.8 for energy goods vs. non-energy goods and 3 
for efficient variants of boilers vs. conventional boilers. The total effect on heating consump-
tion using these assumptions is a decrease of 1.9 percent cf. Table 3.9. If instead the substi-
tution elasticity between energy efficient variants and conventional variants of energy goods 
were set to 2 or 4, then the total effect on heating consumption would be a decrease of re-
spectively about 1.4 percent or about 2.5 percent. If the substitution elasticity between en-
ergy and non-energy goods were set 0.3 then the decrease in EU heating consumption would 
be 2.8 percent. 
Effects on electricity consumption 
The approach to analyse the effects of scenario 2 on electricity consumption is the same as 
the approach used for the analysis of the effects on heating consumption. First, the countries 
of the European Union are classified according to the market share of energy efficient 
household appliances and consumer electronics. Then the share of energy goods and the 
relative energy efficiency of the different groups are described, and finally the size of the 
VAT change in the different country groups is described. 
 
Table 3.10 Classifying EU-countries for the electricity analysis, scenario 2 
Grouping according to volume market share of efficient household appliances and consumer electronics 
Group 1, first quartile: Lux-
embourg, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland 
Group 2, second quartile: 
Czech Republic, France, Aus-
tria, Cyprus, Slovak Republic, 
Greece, Italy 
Group 3, third quartile: Slo-
venia, United Kingdom, 
Lithuania, Ireland, Estonia, 
Poland, Latvia 
Group 4, fourth quartile: 
Hungary, Portugal, Malta, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Spain 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
 
In general the market share of energy efficient variants of household appliances is high in the 
countries of the European Union, and for the purposes of modelling it is assumed that the 
market for consumer electronics shares the features of the market for household appliances 
in this respect. We would expect this to imply that the effect of scenario 2 on the total num-
ber of household appliances and consumer electronics sold, is larger than the effect of sce-
nario 2 on the number of boilers sold. This increases the likelihood that the total electricity 
consumption will increase, in spite of the change in the market share in favour of energy ef-




The high budget shares of household appliances and consumer electronics also indicates a 
large rebound effect, because the VAT reduction implies a large saving of expenditure for 
households. This saving can be used to buy energy consuming goods. 
 
Table 3.11 Characteristics of the country groups 
Country group 
Average in group, market 
share per cent 
Average in group, 
share of household 
appliances and con-
sumer electronics, per 
cent  
Energy consumption of energy 
efficient variant relative to 
conventional variant, per cent 
Group 1  76.3  2.2  38.7 
Group 2  60.6  2.3  50.8 
Group 3  55.9  1.6  53.0 
Group 4  40.1  1.7  60.8 
Note: Malta excluded in share of energy goods due to lack of data. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Bertoldi and Atanasiu (2007a). 
  
The groups do not differ a lot with respect to the improved energy efficiency of energy effi-
cient variants relative to conventional variants, but the general level of energy efficiency is 
high for the energy efficient variants. The gain from improved energy efficiency can thus be 
expected to be relatively large for a given shift in the market shares in the direction of more 
energy efficient goods. 
 
The size of the average VAT changes do not differ much between the different country 
groups, hence the differences in VAT changes cannot be expected to make a significant dif-
ference in the effects on the country groups. However, the average sizes of the VAT changes 
are relatively large, implying that the effect on sales of household appliances and consumer 
electronics can be expected to be large. 
 
Table 3.12 Average VAT changes and effects on electricity consumption in scenario 2 
Country group 
Average VAT decrease, 5%, per-
centage points 
Effect on electricity consumption, 
per cent 
Group 1  15.3  0,7 
Group 2  14.6  0.5 
Group 3  13.7  0,3 
Group 4  12.6  0.1 
Note: Bulgaria and Romania excluded in VAT decrease due to lack of data. . The results have been obtained using 
Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: DG TAXUD (2008)   
 
Scenario 2 leads to an increase in electricity consumption as shown in Table 3.12. This is a 
rebound effect: The countries with large market shares of energy efficient household appli-
ances increase their consumption of electricity the most. Thus, even though there is a gain in 
average energy efficiency within the group of energy products, total energy consumption in-
creases. The large rebound effect on electricity consumption comes from household appli-
ances having a great share of household consumption and general high market shares of effi-





The results in Table 3.12 are sensitive to assumptions made about consumers’ willingness to 
substitute energy efficient variants of household appliances and consumer electronics for 
conventional variants, and on the willingness to substitute energy goods for non-energy 
goods. The substitution elasticities which underlie the results presented in this report are 0.8 
for energy goods vs. non-energy goods and 3 for efficient variants of boilers vs. conventional 
boilers. The total effect on electricity consumption using these assumptions is an increase of 
about 0.5 percent, c.f. Table 3.13. If instead the substitution elasticity between energy effi-
cient variants and conventional variants of energy goods were set to 2 or 4, then the total ef-
fect on electricity consumption would be an increase of about 0.9 percent or a decrease of 
about 0.2 percent. If the substitution elasticity between energy and non-energy goods were 
set 0.3 then scenario 2 would result in a decrease in EU electricity consumption of about 0.3 
percent. 
Total effect on energy consumption 
The total effect of scenario 2 on energy consumption is a reduction in energy consumption 
in the European Union. The reduction in the consumption of heating dominates the in-
crease in electricity consumption, because heating consumption constitutes a larger share of 
the households’ total energy consumption than electricity consumption on average for the 
European Union. The effects of scenario 2 on total energy consumption in the European 
Union is calculated by weighing the estimated effects on heating and electricity consumption 
by the shares of heating and electricity consumption of total energy consumption. 
 
Table 3.13 Change in energy consumption in per cent, EU27 average 
  Mandatory reduction 5% 
Fossil fuels for heating (non-district)  -1.91 
Electricity 0.48 
Total effect 
Change in total energy consumption in EU  -1.34 
Note: The results presented in this table relate to a scenario where VAT rates for energy efficient variants of house-
hold appliances, consumer electronics and boilers are reduced mandatorily in the EU to 5 per cent. The re-
sults have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, 
c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2008). 
 
The results are sensitive to the assumed substitutability of energy efficient and conventional 
variants of energy goods, c.f. Table 3.14. Similarly, the assumptions regarding households’ 
substitution between energy goods and non-energy goods are important. The results in this 
chapter are based on a substitution elasticity of 0.8 between energy goods and non-energy 
goods. If instead this substitution elasticity is set to 0.3, then the effect of scenario 1 on 
household energy consumption in the EU is a 0.3 percent decrease and the effect of scenario 
2 is a 2.5 percent decrease
32. That data description of the end of the report has a short discus-
                                                           
32 Not many econometric estimates exist of the substitution elasticity between energy goods and non-energy goods.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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sion on the economic literature in this area. The reason for these effects are that a higher 
substitution elasticity between energy efficient variants and conventional variants lead con-
sumers to change their consumption structure in the direction of more energy efficient 
household appliances, consumer electronics and boilers instead of conventional variants. The 
higher the substitution elasticity between energy efficient variants and conventional variants, 
the greater the increase in average energy efficiency when VAT is reduced on energy efficient 
variants. Similarly, the greater the substitution elasticity between energy goods and non-
energy goods, the greater the rebound effect, because the VAT reduction leads consumers to 
increase the consumption of energy goods more than they would have done if the substitu-
tion elasticity were lower.  
 







Effect on energy con-
sumption, EU average  -0.95%  -1.34%  -1.93% 
Note: The results have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, 
CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics. 
 
The results are also sensitive to the definition of energy efficient household appliances and 
consumer electronics. The results presented so far for scenario 2 are based on a definition of 
energy efficient variants of household appliances and consumer electronics as those having 
energy class A or better. If instead we define the energy efficient variants as those having A+ 
and A++, the results change markedly as shown in Table 3.15. Netherlands is a country 
where the market share of energy efficient variants is among the highest in the EU, and in 
Spain the corresponding market share is slightly below EU average. The rebound effect is re-
duced markedly, so that the increase in electricity consumption from scenario 2 is all but 
eliminated. 
 
Table 3.15 Sensitivity analysis for scenario 2: Restricting VAT reductions to A+ and A++ 
in Netherlands and Spain, percent 
Increase in electricity consump-
tion 
VAT reduction for A, A+ and A++ 
classes 
(Scenario 2) 
VAT reduction for A+ and A++ 
Netherlands 0.6%  0.1% 
Spain 0.4%  0.0% 
Note: The results have been obtained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, 
CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics.   
Effects on income distribution 
Spending shares on household appliances, consumer electronics and boilers are almost iden-
tical across different household categories, cf. Table 3.16. As a result, we consider the direct 
income distribution effect from lower VAT rates on energy efficient goods to be minor.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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However, we would expect some relative improvement for high income families as their 
spending is likely to be allocated more in the upmarket end where the most energy efficient 
products tend to be concentrated. The lowest income quintiles lose relative to the high in-
come quintiles because they consume less energy efficient appliances than the high income 
quintiles 
 











Household  appliances  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Consumer  electronics  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 
Boilers  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
EU 27 average (unweighted)  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  0.8 
Note: Per cent of total household expenditure. COICOP structure of household expenditure, 2005. Czech Repub-
lic excluded due to lack of data. Quintile 1 is the poorest / Quintile 5 is the richest. Countries are weighted 
by size of final household expenditure.  
Source:  Eurostat and Copenhagen Economics  
Public revenue effects 
The VAT revenue effect of scenario 2 is relatively small mainly due to the low share of total 
consumption which is constituted by household appliances, consumer electronics and boil-
ers. Hence the VAT base is relatively small. In addition, the small market share of energy ef-
ficient boilers serves to further reduce the VAT base of the reduction. These two effects 
counteract and dominate two other effects which by themselves imply a large revenue loss 
due to scenario 2. The first is the deadweight loss arising from the pre-existing large market 
share of energy efficient household appliances. This implies that a large VAT reduction is 
given to households which would have purchased energy efficient household appliances even 
in the absence of a VAT reduction. The second is the relatively high elasticity of substitution 
between energy efficient variants and conventional variants. This implies that scenario 2 




Table 3.17 VAT revenue effects in scenario 2 applying the mandatory 5% VAT rate 
Determinants of dy-







cent of VAT 







loss, per cent of 
VAT revenues 
Total VAT revenue 
loss, 
per cent of GDP 
1 -1.7  18 -16  -0.3  -2.0  -0.1 
2 -1.  2 21 -14  -0.2  -1.5  -0.1 
3 -0.9 21 -14  -0.2  -1.1  -0.1 
4 -0.6 18 -14  -0.1  -0.7  -0.0 
EU aggregate   -1.2  19  -14  -0.2  -1.5  -0.1 
Note: Static, dynamic and total losses are calculated as percentage of benchmark VAT revenue. The static calcula-
tion captures the effect of changes in the structure of the VAT in scenario. The dynamic effect captures the 
effect of the consumption adjustments in the general equilibrium setting. The total effect is a sum of the 
two. VAT base change is in percentage of benchmark value. VAT rate change is in percentage points. 
Weighted averages. * Percentage points. . The results on the dynamic and total revenue loss have been ob-
tained using Copenhagen Economics’ computable general equilibrium model, CEVM, c.f. Box 3.1. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and Eurostat. 
   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
 
  77
In this chapter we discuss aspects of a VAT reduction policy that concerns the internal mar-
ket and innovation. First, we discuss whether the overall EU innovation efforts will be im-
proved if root taxation is supplemented with selective support measures focusing on specific 
areas of abetment (section 4.1). Second, we look at how selective support to energy efficient 
appliances, such as voluntary/mandatory VAT reduction, affects the uniformity of business 
conditions on the internal market (section 4.2.). And third, we discuss the risk that cross 
border trade in energy efficient appliances will be large in the case of a voluntary regime (sec-
tion 4.3).  
4.1.  INNOVATION FRAMEWORK: WHAT SET OF INCENTIVES IS BEST? 
Policies that increase demand for energy efficient products within the household will in-
crease incentives to innovate such products, the question is whether this boosts overall inno-
vation in this field of activity. The most logical way to approach this problem is to assume 
that the EU will reach its climate and energy targets not the least through the use of market 
based root taxation such as the ETS and national taxes alongside. How will additional meas-
ures favouring specific kind of energy savings act on overall innovation? 
 
Minimum efficiency standards (MES) create incentives to innovate efficient products, sim-
ply because products that do not meet the MES are not sellable. Labelling schemes visualise 
energy efficiency, and thereby, increase demand for more efficient products. A VAT reduc-
tion increases demand for efficient products through a price cut; Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
different instruments. To the extent that production costs falls with the scale of production 
costs, then future deployment costs of energy efficient freezers, air conditioners, boilers fall.  
This is so-called learning cost argument used as an argument for using subsidies for specific 
market “ready” products that has been put forward both in the context of energy saving as 
well as renewable energy production..  
 
Chapter 4  EFFECTS ON THE INTERNAL MARKET AND BUSINESS
INNOVATION   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Note: MES = Minimum efficiency standard   
Source: Copenhagen Economics   
 
In a setting where all of the above mentioned instruments are in play the demand for prod-
ucts with reduced VAT will be strengthened. The increased demand in turn creates incen-
tives for firms to reallocate some innovation resources to energy efficient product develop-
ment. However, once a firm has innovated products that qualify for the reduced VAT incen-
tives for further efficiency innovation decrease or vanish. If the thresholds for VAT reduction 
are not updated this may have the adverse effect that most energy consuming products are 
subsidised through reduced VAT and that the policy will turn counterproductive. That is 
indeed why most research suggests a process where upcoming standards lifts are announced 
to the market in good time.  
 
More generally, there is no empirical evidence nor a priori economic reasoning that suggests 
that the costs of meeting climate and energy policy coals will be reduced due to such policy 
directed innovation. Just assume, that we get in place a well calibrated subsidy programme 
using fixed amount subsidies – not reduced VAT rates – which lead to a net reduction in 
consumption of electricity. This leads to a fall in the price of ETS allowances and hence a di-
rect reduced incentive to save energy and CO2 in all other products not covered by the sub-
sidy. The learning curve argument suffers from the same problem: the quicker deployment 
of market ready but not yet competitive products to reduce future production costs will at be 
costs of innovation efforts in other areas potentially outside the area of mitigation technolo-
gies. Innovation activities are carried out by a relatively small pool of highly qualified pool of 
researchers in the private and public sector, so accelerated industrial RD efforts induced by 
policy incentives is likely to be meet by reduced RD efforts elsewhere
33. So we distort incen-
tives to save energy savings, leading arguably to higher not lower compliance costs
34.  
                                                           
33 Pizer and Popp (2007) page 5 and 6 underlines the limited supply argument for “scientists and engineers” and re-
fers to another study that concluded that one-half of all energy related – policy directed or not – were at the expense 
of other RD during the 1970 and 198s. They suggest that cost reductions “from learning by doing” (LBD) may be 













The basic issue in terms of innovation boils down to a question of  a choice between abate-
ment and innovation being driven by equal abatement costs across sectors or a more selective 
approach where incentives are more focused in areas where a priori analysis suggest that the 
market it self will generate innovation below its potential. We recommend in line with re-
cent survey that policy efforts should focus not on boosting market ready innovation but ba-
sic research
35. 
4.2.  TRADE OFFS BETWEEN MANDATORY/VOLUNTARY RATE REDUCTIONS 
The choice of making a VAT-reduction mandatory or voluntary is signified by a trade-off 
between efficiency of the policy, which is likely to be larger in the policy is voluntary, and 
uniformity of business conditions across the EU, which is favoured by a mandatory policy.   
 
As concluded in chapter 2, there are some countries in which certain energy efficient prod-
ucts already have high penetration rates. In those countries and for those products it would 
probably be inefficient to reduce VAT rates. The obvious reason for this inefficiency is that 
the penetration rate for efficient products can not increase much. Instead, a VAT-reduction 
under such circumstances would risk encouraging increased consumption of appliances, and 
thereby promote higher energy consumption. If, for instance prices on energy efficient 
products are cut, one might afford to buy a second efficient computer or switch to a larger 
efficient freezer, this is the rebound effect discussed in Chapter 2.  Due to the significant di-
vergence in penetration rates of energy efficient products across Europe this makes a strong 
argument for a voluntary policy.  
 
On the other hand, a mandatory policy increases the uniformity of business conditions 
within the European Union which promotes efficiency in the internal market. For instance, 
unwanted cross border trade would increase if there is a voluntary VAT reduction. A manda-
tory policy with a fixed VAT rate would, in contrast, reduce cross border trade since it 
would remove the current differences in VAT between the Member States. Hence, there is a 
trade-off between the efficiency of the VAT-reduction and the adverse effects on the internal 
market, cf. Table 4.1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
at lower opportunity costs than innovation because innovation workers are less involved. At the same time, they 
stress that the empirical literature on LBD fails to make clear whether the cost savings over time is really due to 
simple scale production effects over time or as well from gains from past innovation efforts in which case this dis-
tinction is of less direct use. In any case, LBD gains in one industry will tend to be wholly or partly offset by lower 
learnings cost reductions in other sectors of the economy. Similar conclusions are reached in Popp (2003). 
34 Aldy and Pizer (2008) concludes in an overall review paper on US climate policies page 22: “”This combination 
of performance standards and a cap-and-trade programme will tend to increase costs over a cap-and-trade pro-
gramme standing along with the same environmental outcome”. 
35 Aldy and Pizer 2008) concludes that the case for RD and innovation policies in the area of mitigation “…is 
strongest in the early phases of RD and weakest for the last step of increasing deployment of existing technologies”.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Table 4.1 The trade-off between policy efficiency and business environment 
Type of policy  Uniformity of business conditions Efficiency of VAT-reduction 
Voluntary VAT reduction  Decrease  High 
Mandatory VAT reduction  Increase  Low 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
An alternative to reduced VAT rates on energy efficient products is national schemes. By na-
tional subsidy policy we mean a policy that gives a subsidy to any citizen who buys a certain 
product regardless of where he or she buys it. This type of subsidy can be applied to the spe-
cific products that need subsidies in the concerned country and are in that sense an efficient 
method. National subsidy policies would decrease the uniformity of business conditions 
across member states since some products would be subsidised in some countries but not in 
others. However, an increased use of national subsidy policies would not affect the cross 
border trade since it applies regardless of where the good has been bought. 
4.3.  SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF CROSS BORDER TRADE WITH VOLUNTARY POLICY 
In this section we conclude that the concerned environmentally friendly goods that are can-
didates for reduced VAT typically have characteristics that make them suitable for cross bor-
der sales, that is when a consumer crosses a border to make a purchase. A scheme under 
which the reduction of VAT on environmentally friendly goods is voluntary could therefore 
be troublesome due to increased cross border sales.  
 
If VAT rates differ between Member States we predict that prices will also differ between 
member states. The difference in prices will be due to the different VAT rates rather than 
due to differences in production costs or competition between member states. If all consum-
ers would always buy their goods wherever they were the cheapest this situation would create 
cross border trade and might force efficient, perhaps even the most efficient, local distribu-
tors to shut down. An example of where increased cross border trade has had serious conse-
quences is the cross border trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that 
was caused by a large difference in excise duty on petrol. The cross border trade forced sev-
eral petrol stations to shut down and large investments to become useless, cf. Box 4.1. 
 
Box 4.1 Cross border trade of petrol in Northern Ireland and Ireland 
Between the years of 2000 and 2001 sales in fuel in Northern Ireland dropped by 47.5 per cent which led to 
that several filling stations close to the Irish border had to shut down and that large investments in petrol 
distribution close to the border became close to useless. The reason for the drop in fuel sales were vast dif-
ferences in excise duty in The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The resulting price gap, around 30p 
a litre, between the countries caused motorists to cross the border to fill up their vehicles and also pre-
sented a lucrative opportunity for smugglers.  
Source: Motor Trader (2002) 
 
Trade between countries with different VAT rates is only an issue when the VAT is paid in 
the products’ country of origin. If the VAT of the country of destination is applied there 
would be no gains from shopping abroad that were due to differences in VAT. The country 
of origin principle applies when there is cross border trade, in other words, when the buyer   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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crosses a boarder to purchase a product. The exceptions to this rule mainly concern distance 
selling, but we judge them to be of minor importance in this context. A detailed overview of 
the rules governing the country of origin and country of destination principles are provided 
in Table 4.2. We conclude that the relevant cause of internal market distortion is cross bor-
der trade.  
 
Table 4.2 Rules for country of origin and country of destination principles 
    Country of Origin Principle  Country of Destination Principle 
Goods  Main rule  Exception: New means of transport   Cross-border sales 
Services  Main rule when consumers (tourism, den-
tistry) or physical products (auto repair, 
repair of movable property) cross the bor-
der 
Exception: When service providers (main-
tenance and repair of property) cross the 
border 
Goods  Exception: Small vendors  Main rule  Distance sales 
Services  Main rule, notably for intra community 
supply of Telecom & broadcasting, digital 
content products such as e-books and e-
music.  
Exception: Telecom & broadcasting, digi-
tal content products such as e-books and 
e-music supplied by third country opera-
tors 
Note:  Special rules apply for non-commercial legal entity such as associations and public authorities if the total 
buying - from other EU member states during the year - exceeds some threshold value. In this case, the legal 
entity looses the right of buying in other EU countries at lower VAT rates than the ones that apply in the 
destination country. When the client is an exempted small business, the same special rules apply as for non 
commercial and public authorities. The rules governing the place of supply of services have been modified 
by Directive 2008/08/EC and will change as from 01/01/2010. Concerning telecom & broadcasting, digital 
content products such as e-books and e-music, the main rule will become, as from 01/01/2015, the destina-
tion principle. 
Source:  European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Cross border tradability 
In order to decide whether a given product is suitable for cross border trading or not we have 
identified a number of factors affecting cross border tradability. The considered products 
typically have a high price per unit, high transportability, high brand value and low perisha-
bility during transport. Together, these factors make the products well suited for cross bor-
der sales, cf. Box 4.2. 
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Box 4.2 Indicators of cross border tradability 
Price per unit 
Everything else equal, a higher price per unit in absolute terms increases the potential price difference 
across countries and therefore increases the likelihood that a good will be traded across borders.  
 
Transportability 
A product that is relatively heavy is less likely to be traded across borders. The reason is simply that it is 
less convenient and more costly to transport heavy goods as compared to lighter goods. Weight per unit is 
used as a measure of transportability. 
 
Brand Value 
A high brand value might be a reason for shoppers to search for goods abroad in case it is not available on 
the domestic market. This is confirmed in the Eurobarometer on cross border trade in 2004. We have esti-
mated the brand value within each product category by considering three aspects; whether the design of 
the products is important in the consumer’s purchasing decision, whether it is a typical consumer product 
and whether the price spread within the product category is large in relation to the quality spread. 
 
Perishability during transport 
Goods that quickly perish or break easily during transport will be less attractive to transport for long dis-
tances. The perishability during transport of a good is not immediately measurable and has here been es-
timated by us. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics, Optem (2004),  Eurobarometer (2004) 
 
We have applied the indicators discussed above to the relevant products. For instance food-
stuffs have low cross border tradability because they typically have a low price per unit, are 
perishable during transport and have low brand value although transportable.
36 Cars on the 
other hand would have very high cross border tradability as cars have high prices; high brand 
value, high transportability and they do not perish during transport.
37 A complete ranking of 
all concerned products is presented in Table 4.3 below. Definition of price interval is as fol-
lows: products unit prices below €100 are rated as low price, between €100 and €1000 are 
rated medium price and above €1000 are rated high price. Further description of the table is 
found in the table note. 
 
                                                           
36 In addition, foodstuffs are typically already subject to reduced VAT. 
37 New cars are however subject to the country of destination principle which means that VAT is paid in the mem-
ber state where the car is utilised. Therefore, a lower VAT in a neighbouring member state does not constitute an 
incentive to purchase it abroad. Used cars sold by final consumers are outside the scope of VAT and are not af-
fected. Used cars sold by reseller of second hands goods are subject to VAT in the Member State of origin, on the 
basis of a special scheme taxing the margin of the supplier (the difference between selling price and purchase price). 
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Table 4.3 Cross border tradability ranking of concerned products 







Brand value  Perishability
Cars  High  High High High High Low 
Computers  High  Mid High High High Low 
Televisions  High  High Mid Mid High Low 
Electric ovens  High  High Mid Mid Mid Low 
Imaging equipment  Mid  Low High Mid High Low 
Domestic refrigera-
tion, freezers  Mid  Mid  Mid Low High Low 
Central heating 
boilers  Mid  Mid Mid High  Low Low 
Washing, dish-
washing  Mid  Mid Mid Mid Mid Low 
Electric Boilers  Mid  Low High High Low Low 
Air conditioning  Mid  Mid Mid Mid Low Low 
Motors, pumps  Mid  Mid Mid Mid Low Low 
Fluorescent lighting  Mid  Low High High Low Mid 
Batteries   Mid  Low High Low Mid Low 
Insulation    Mid  Mid Mid Low Low Low 
Water heaters  Low  Mid Mid Low Low Low 
Domestic lighting  Low  Low High Low Low Mid 
Foodstuffs  Low  Low High Low Low High 
Note: Price  categories: Low EUR 0-100; Medium EUR 100-1 000; High EUR 1 000 + 
Transportability categories are: Low 100 kg +; Medium10-100 kg ; High 0-10 kg  
Price/Weight categories are (EUR/Kg): Low 0-10; Medium11-50; High 50 + 
Brand value categories are a combination of whether the design of the products is important in the con-
sumer’s purchasing decision, whether it is a typical consumer product and whether the price spread within 
the product category is large in relation to the quality spread. 
Perishablitity is a subjective estimate based on common sense. 
Source: www.kjell.se, www.onoff.com, www.elonline.se, www.pricerunner.se, www.siba.se, www.clasohlson.se, 
www.smaky.se, www.hannus.se, www.tretti.se, conrad-schweden.websale.biz , www.kelkoo.se, www.ikea.se, 
www.prylportalen.se, www.smartson.se, www.mat.konsumentverket.se, www.testfakta.se, www.nextag.co.uk 
Voluntary or mandatory VAT reduction? 
The conclusion that the concerned products are suitable for cross border sales entails that 
cross border sales are likely to increase if differentiated VAT rates would be implemented in 
some countries and not in others. The increased cross border sales due to differences in VAT 
would disturb the internal market to some extent.   
 
To see this, imagine the following scenario: France, in their efforts to promote environmen-
tally friendly products, decides to differentiate their VAT. For a certain group of products 
they decrease VAT to 5 per cent. Now a Belgian citizen planning to reequip his kitchen has 
the choice of either purchasing the necessary goods in Belgium at a 21 per cent VAT or 
travel to France to shop at a 5 per cent VAT. A purchase of a refrigerator, a freezer and an 
electrical oven amounting to €4000 exclusive of VAT would then be €640 cheaper in France 
than in Belgium, due to the different VAT rates. This disturbs the internal market and the 
injured party in this example would be the Belgian trader of environmentally friendly white 
good products. 
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The extent to which effects like the one described above take place depends on which coun-
tries reduce their VAT. In a particular setting, namely scenario 2 as described in chapter 3, a 
mandatory VAT regime would render eight borders in the internal market with a difference 
in VAT rate between 13 and 17 percentage units. The borders and the difference in percent-
age units between a VAT-reducing country and its neighbour are shown in Table 4.4 below. 
 
Table 4.4 VAT difference between neighbouring countries under scenario 2 
 






Belgium  16  No border  No border  16  No border  No border 
France  -  No border  No border  No border  No border  0 
Germany  14  No border  No border  14  No border  No border 
Ireland  No border  -  No border  No border  No border  0 
Italy  13  No border  No border  No border  No border  No border 
Luxembourg  13  No border  No border  No border  No border  No border 
Spain  17  No border  No border  No border  17  No border 
United King-
dom  0  0 No  border 0 No  border - 
Note: The differences shown in the cells are the differences between the reduced VAT rate (5%) in the VAT-
reducing countries in scenario 2 and the standard VAT rate in neighbouring countries that du not reduce 
their VAT 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, DGTAX (2006) 
Developing alternative instruments as a response to constraints of internal market   
Taxing at the root is the first-best principle, as concluded in chapter 2. However, internal 
market effects such as cross border trade discussed above may discourage countries from tax-
ing at the root. In this section we provide an example of where the threat of increased cross 
border trade is likely to have caused countries to adopt second best taxes. Again, fuel taxes 
serve as an example.  
 
If root taxes – i.e. taxes on gasoline and diesel – are raised, both private consumers and haul-
ers may respond by tanking up in other countries with lower prices. Such “tanker tourism” 
will have negative fiscal consequences for the country with the higher fuel taxes. 
 
Tanker tourism is an issue both for commercial road haulers and for private consumers. An 
impact assessment from the European Commission
38 points to the fact that excise duties on 
fuel account for between 6 and 18 per cent of the running costs of a road haulage business. 
With high competition and narrow profit margins in the road haulage business, focus is very 
much on minimizing costs, and tanking cheap fuel is, therefore, an explicit part of the fiscal 
planning of road haulage businesses. A study by OECD has shown that whereas the annual 
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consumption of diesel per capita was less than 750 liters in some Member States, it 
amounted to more than 4200 liters in Luxembourg, a Member State which has a diesel ex-
cise duty lower than all of its neighbors.  
 
The issue of cross-border trade is likely to have played a major role in the development of al-
ternative policy instruments to encourage both the development and the purchase of less en-
ergy consuming vehicles. Thus, many European countries have embedded energy savings in-
centives in registration taxes and/or user taxes (i.e. vehicle excise duties), cf. Table 4.5. His-
torically, these second best taxes have in fact been motivated by pure fiscal concerns rather 
than by CO2 emissions. 
 
Table 4.5 Countries with vehicle excise duty or registration taxes 
Countries  Vehicle excise duty  Registration tax 
CY, DK, FI, IE, NL, SE, BE  X  X 
AT, FR, ES    X 
DE, IT, LU, UK    X   
BG, EE, GR, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI      
Note:  Fourteen Member States have CO2 emissions-based elements in their car and/or fuel taxation systems.  
Source: ACEA (2008) 
 
The problem with such taxes is that they do not provide incentives for reducing car use once 
the cars are bought – they only provide incentives for consumers to purchase more fuel-
efficient cars, and for car manufacturers to improve fuel efficiency (as long as the costs can be 
passed on to consumers and do not exceed the rebate in vehicle excise duty and/or registra-
tion tax). Furthermore, fuel efficiency standards on which the taxes are based are pretty 
rough approximations of actual use and, hence, do not target CO2 emissions very well. 
 
Fuel taxes are the first-best option and seen from a community point of view, the upcoming 
review of the Energy Tax Directive should be used to harmonise – to some extent – the cur-
rently large differences in fuel prices between Member States, cf. Figure 4.2 (showing taxes 
on gasoline). An upward revision of fuel taxes that are well below “average” would at the 
same time decrease fuel use and decrease the incentive to buy fuel across the border. 
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Figure 4.2 Fuel taxes on gasoline 


















Group 1: BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, CY, LV, LT, HU, PO, RO, SI, and SK (within a range of 20% around the minimum excise duty of 359€ per 1,000 litres)
Group 2: BE, DK, DE, FR, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT, FI, and SE (bars indicate the lowest and highest value in the group)
Group 3: UK
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Electricity Electricity  571  100  20  20.0 
District heating  105  14.2  20 
Gas 223  30.3  20 
Heating oil  230  31.2  20 
Austria 
Heating 
Solid fuel  179  24.3  10 
17.6 
Electricity Electricity  618  100  21   
District heating  1  0.1  21 
Gas 437  52.9  21 
Heating oil  368  44.6  21 
Belgium 
Heating 
Solid fuel  20  2.4  6 
20.6 
Electricity Electricity  408  100  20   
District heating  88  35.5  20 
Gas 16  6.5  20 
Heating oil  1  0.4  20 
Bulgaria 
Heating 
Solid fuel  143  57.7  20 
20.0 
Electricity Electricity  724  100  15  15 
District heating  1  0.2  15 
Gas 123  28.3  15 
Heating oil  240  55.3  15 
Cyprus 
Heating 
Solid fuel  70  16.1  15 
15.0 
Electricity  Electricity  616  100 25 25 
District heating  794  68.7  25 
Gas 151  13.1  25 
Heating oil  150  13.0  25 
Denmark 
Heating 
Solid fuel  61  5.3  25 
25.0 
Electricity Electricity  292  100  18   
District heating  249  62.4  18 
Gas 38  9.5  18 
Heating oil  9  2.3  18 
Estonia 
Heating 
Solid fuel  103  25.8  5 
14.6 
Electricity Electricity  516  100  22  22 
District heating  101  32.8  22 
Gas 0  0.0  22 
Heating oil  124  40.3  22 
Finland 
Heating 
Solid fuel  83  26.9  22 
22.0 
662 77.7  19.6  Electricity Electricity 
190   22.3  5.5 
16.5 
0 0.0  19.6  District heating 
 0.0  5.5 
142  24.3 *   19.6  Gas 
37 6.3  5.5 
Heating oil  361  61.6  19.6 
France 
Heating 
Solid fuel  46  7.8  5.5 
17.6 
Electricity Electricity  283  100  19  19 
District heating  283  24.2  19 
Gas 321  27.4  19 
Heating oil  283  24.2  19 
Germany 
Heating 
Solid fuel  283  24.2  7 
16.1 
Electricity Electricity  404  100  19  19.0 
District heating  4  0.7  19 
Gas9 30 5.4  9 
Heating oil  452  81.6  19 
Greece 
Heating 
Solid fuel  68  12.3  9 
17.2 
Electricity Electricity  506  100  20  20.0 
District heating  163  22.3  20 
Gas5 449  61.4  5 
Heating oil  0  0.0  5 
Hungary 
Heating 
Solid fuel  119  16.3  20 
10.8 
Electricity Electricity  550  100  13.5  13.5 
District heating  0  0.0  13.5 
Gas 214  29.8  13.5 
Heating oil  309  43.1  13.5 
Ireland 
Heating 
Solid fuel  194  27.1  13.5 
13.5 
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Electricity Electricity  486  100  20  20.0 
District heating  125  13.1  20 
Gas 690  72.4  10 
Heating oil  79  8.3  20 
Italy 
Heating 
Solid fuel  59  6.2  10 
12.1 
Electricity Electricity 217  100  18  18.0 
District heating  325  65.0  18 
Gas 107  21.4  5 
Heating oil  0  0.0  18 
Latvia 
Heating 
Solid fuel  68  13.6  5 
13.5 
Electricity Electricity  235  100  18  18.0 
District heating  326  64.8  18 
Gas 102  20.3  18 
Heating oil  0  0.0  18 
Lithuania 
Heating 
Solid fuel  75  14.9  18 
18.0 
Electricity Electricity  730  100  6  6.0 
Gas6 450  38.7  6 
Solid fuel  26  2.2  12 
District heating  0  0.0  12 
Luxembourg 
Heating 
Heating oil  688  59.1  12 
9.7 
Electricity Electricity  416  100  5  5.0 
District heating  0  0.0  18 
Gas 68  79.1  18 
Heating oil  13  15.1  18 
Malta 
Heating 
Solid fuel  5  5.8  18 
18.0 
Electricity Electricity  646  100  19  19.0 
District heating  56  6.6  19 
Gas 789  92.6  19 
Heating oil  4  0.5  19 
Netherlands 
  Heating 
Solid fuel  3  0.4  19 
19.0 
Electricity Electricity  356  100  22  22.0 
District heating  280  39.9  22 
Gas 196  27.9  22 
Heating oil  7  1.0  22 




188.6 26.9  7 
18.0 
Electricity Electricity  550  100  5  5.0 
District heating  18.5  5.5  20 
Gas5 258  77.0  5 
Heating oil  18.5  5.5  20 
Portugal 
Heating 
Solid fuel  40  11.9  20 
8.4 
Electricity Electricity 240  100  19  19.0 
District heating  78  20.6  19 
Gas 198  52.2  19 
Heating oil  0  0.0  19 
Romania 
Heating 
Solid fuel  103  27.2  19 
19.0 
Electricity Electricity 577  100  19  19.0 
District heating  511  44.9  19 
Gas 558  49.0  19 
Heating oil  1  0.1  19 
Slovakia 
Heating 
Solid fuel  68  6.0  19 
19.0 
Electricity Electricity  586  100  20  20.0 
District heating  169  17.0  20 
Gas 152  15.3  20 
Heating oil  455  45.7  20 
Slovenia 
Heating 
Solid fuel  219  22.0  20 
20.0 
Electricity Electricity 425  100  16  16.0 
District heating  0  0.0  16 
Gas 233  67.0  16 
Heating oil  101  29.0  16 
Spain 
Heating 
Solid fuel  14  4.0  16 
16.0 
Electricity Electricity  796  100  25  25.0 
District heating  57  47.9  25 
Gas 0  0.0  25 
Heating oil  42  35.3  25 
Sweden 
Heating 
Solid fuel  20  16.8  25 
25.0   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Electricity Electricity  465  100  5  5.0 
District heating  0  0.0  17.5 
Gas 429  85.6  5 
Heating oil  62  12.4  5 
United 
Kingdom  Heating 











Our consumption dataset contains data on the structure of expenditures in the budget of: 
 
  the representative household  
  five representative households defined by income quintiles 
 
in each of the EU27 countries. The native level of detail in the dataset is chosen to allow the 
identification of the product groups of interest, such as household appliances and consumer 
electronics. Subsequently, the dataset can deliver consumption share statistics on these prod-
uct groups.  
Representative household consumption expenditure 
The structure of representative household consumption expenditure is the mean household 
consumption expenditure of private households, COICOP level 3 in PPS, for 2005. We use 
the PPS dataset which provides the monetary expenditure amounts, as well as makes it pos-
sible to calculate shares. The data is available in Eurostat for all EU countries, except for 
Czech Republic.  
Addition of boiler statistics 
COICOP classifies boilers as an investment rather than consumption expenditure, and 
therefore boilers are excluded from the statistics. For the purpose of this project, it is neces-
sary, however, to approximate the level of expenditure on boilers by the representative 
household.  
To this purpose, our approach is to add boilers as an extra entry alongside the existing ex-
penditure categories of the representative household.  
 
We use market price and sales data from EC (2007b) to estimate the value of national boiler 
markets, in 2004, as 2005 data is not available. Thereafter, we calculate an implied number 
of households, by dividing the value of final household consumption expenditure by the size 
of the expenditures of the representative household for each one of the EU countries where 
data on the boiler market is available.
39 Finally, we obtain the size of the household expendi-
tures on boilers in 2005, in PPS, by dividing the value of the boiler market in PPS by the 
number of households in the country. We use EUROSTAT, conversion tables to convert 
from € or national currency to PPS for each of the countries.  The missing values for Slova-
kia, Bulgaria and Romania are assumed to equal the value for Czech Republic. The missing 
values for Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg are assumed to equal the value for Estonia.  
 
 
                                                           
39 Austria, Belgium, Czech R., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. 




Representation of products subject to efficiency regulations in consumption data 
DG Transport and Energy is in charge of implementing regulations on efficiency for a range 
of energy consuming goods. Before energy efficiency standards are imposed for a good, DG 
Transport and Energy carries out technical studies. The list of candidate goods for which en-
ergy efficiency standards are envisioned is available on the website of the DG.
40 
COICOP level 3 categories are broader than the goods subject to energy efficiency require-
ments. In order to avoid over representing the share of consumption of  the goods subject to 
energy efficiency requirements in consumption data, the relevant COICOP level 3 categories 
must be disaggregated. For that purpose, estimates of the share of goods subject to energy ef-
ficiency criteria in respective COICOP level 3 categories must be derived. For example, light 
bulbs are a part of COICOP category cp0552 “Small tools and miscellaneous accessories”, 
which in addition includes a large amount of other irrelevant products, cf. Table 0.1. It is as-
sumed that electric bulbs and florescent lighting tubes account for 5% of the consumption 
expenditure on COICOP category cp0552. 
41 The remaining household appliances are rep-
resented by splitting categories cp0531 “Major household appliances whether electric or 
not”, consumer electronics representation is based on cp0911 “Equipment for the reception, 
recording and reproduction of sound and pictures”, cp0912 “Photographic and cinemato-
graphic equipment and optical instruments”, cp0913 “Information processing equipment”, 
whereas boilers are represented as explained above. 
 
Table 0.1 Example of COICOP disaggregation 





Name of  
COICOP cate-
gory 
Contents of Coicop category 
Weight  
assumed 




Small tools and 
miscellaneous 
accessories 
Hand tools, such as saws, hammers, screwdrivers, 
wrenches, spanners, pliers, trimming knives, rasps 
and files; 
Garden tools such as wheel barrows, watering cans, 
hoses, spades, shovels, rakes, forks, scythes, sickles 
and secateurs; 
Ladders and steps 
Door fittings (hinges, handles and locks) , fittings for 
radiators and fireplaces, other metal articles for the 
house (curtain rails, carpet rods, hooks, etc.)  or for 
the garden (chains, grids, stakes and hoop segments 
for fencing and bordering); 
Small electric accessories such as power sockets, 
switches, wiring flex, electric bulbs, fluorescent 
lighting tubes, torches, flashlights, hand-lamps, 
electric batteries for general use, bells and alarms 
0.05 
Source: Copenhagen Economics and UNSTATS 
 
                                                           
40 See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/demand/legislation/doc/planning.pdf  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/demand/legislation/doc/issues_to_be_studied.pdf 
41 The exact estimation of the share electric bulbs and florescent lighting tubes among all the products in the cate-
gory cp0552 is beyond the scope of the study.   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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Structure of consumption expenditure by income quintile 
The 2005 data on the structure of consumption expenditure by income quintile is only 
available at COICOP level 2, in Eurostat. We also use the mean consumption expenditure 
by income quintile in PPS to obtain the size of monetary expenditures. Boiler statistics are 
added to each of the quintile expenditures, by assuming that the structure of quintile differ-
ences for boilers is the same as for household appliances.  
 
Consolidating the representative household data with data by income quintile 
The representative household consumption dataset and the structure of consumption expen-
diture by income quintile are available at different levels of disaggregation. For modelling 
purposes, however, it is pertinent to assure the most detailed available split of consumption 
expenditures, in order to obtain a precise representation of the goods of interest in scenarios. 
Therefore, the representative household and quintile consumption datasets are consolidated.  
Since the representative household dataset is more disaggregated, the approach is to assume 
that it represents expenditures of quintile 3. Quintile 1,2 and 4,5 expenditure shares are de-
rived by weighting quintile 3 expenditures, per COICOP level 3 category, using the corre-
sponding COICOP level 2 shares from the original quintile data as weights. In this way, a 
consumption dataset is constructed by quintile, at COICOP level 3, and with the represen-
tative household consumption expenditures integrated.  
VAT DATASET 
Disaggregation in the source publication 
Our source of VAT rates is the DG TAXUD publication “VAT rates applied in the member 
states of the European Community”, 2008. For each of the EU countries, the publication 
gives the VAT rate applicable to a selection of products, economic activities or sectors, such 
as lemonade, cultural events or passenger transport. The sectors are harmonized across the 
countries, however, they do not correspond to any standard classification, such as COICOP, 
NACE or similar.  
Consolidation with the consumption dataset 
Therefore, we need to integrate the sectoral classification from the DG TAXUD publication 
to the COICOP, in order to match the level of VAT with consumption expenditures. The 
consolidation follows the methodology from our earlier study; see Copenhagen Economics 
(2007).  
PRODUCT EFFICIENCY DATASET  
Breakdown of energy  
For the modelling purposes, it is necessary to distinguish between the energy efficient and 
inefficient variants of household appliances, boilers, and consumer electronics. The COI-  Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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COP does not offer such split. Therefore, it is necessary to split the original COICOP cate-
gories using information on the relative share of efficient and inefficient appliances. Since 
COICOP represents flows, the necessary information is the relative share of efficient and in-
efficient appliances in the sales – rather than stock – of products. Our approach is therefore, 
to obtain the relevant sales statistics broken down by efficiency and use the shares for split-
ting the COICOP categories defining boilers, household appliances and consumer electron-
ics. Our principal sources are the following: 
 
  Energy efficiency of boiler sales: EC (2007b) 
  Energy efficiency of household appliances: IVM (2008), Bertoldi & Atanasiu 
(2007), www.bycentral.co.uk, Kemna et.al. (2007) 
 
As for energy efficiency of consumer electronics, we did not find relevant statistics on energy 
efficiency. The lack of data represents the lagging status of labelling and efficiency require-
ments for electronics vis-à-vis household appliances
42. For modelling purposes, we assume 
that the relative efficiency of consumer electronics is the same as that of household appli-
ances, in a given country.  
 
Classification of efficient products 
We split household appliances and boilers into categories of energy efficient and inefficient 
products. For household appliances this is done according to the European Union energy la-
bel for refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, dishwashers, and ovens. The energy effi-
ciency of the appliance is rated in terms of a set of energy efficiency classes from A++ to G 
with A++ being the most energy efficient, G the least efficient. A product is considered en-
ergy efficient if it is labelled A or better, all other products are inefficient. Concerning do-
mestic lighting, CFLs (Compact, fluorescent lamps) are considered energy efficient while in-
candescent lamps are considered inefficient. Boilers are considered energy efficient if they are 
of a condensing type and inefficient if they are non-condensing. According to our calcula-
tions, efficient household appliances (domestic lighting excluded) consume between 64 and 
84 per cent of the energy consumed by their inefficient counterparts
43. The energy efficiency 
of boilers is calculated based on the average percentage of fuel converted to heat for condens-
ing and non-condensing types and the energy consumption of an efficient boiler is shown to 
be approximately 88 per cent of that of an inefficient boiler.  
 
Market shares and data treatment 
Our data on markets shares is extensive, however not complete. Where data is missing we as-
sume, for modelling purposes, that the market share of a given product in a given country is 
                                                           
42 Energy efficiency regulation in the area of labelling and minimum efficiency standards is more developed for 
household appliances than consumer electronics. Therefore, more statistics on the sales of energy efficient and inef-
ficient products is available for household appliances than consumer electronics.  
43 Except for domestic lighting where the energy consumption of CFLs is 23 per cent of that of non-CFLs.    Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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To aggregate the market shares of the various household appliances into a joint measure of 
market shares for efficient and inefficient household appliances we use weights based on ma-
jor appliances’ penetration in households. These weights are moreover used when calculating 
the weighted energy consumption of efficient and inefficient products in the Member States.  
 
By collecting information on average prices and average energy consumption per year for the 
various products, relative prices and energy consumption of efficient vis-à-vis inefficient 
products are determined. This information is further used when assessing the share of energy 
efficient products in energy consumption and household expenditure. By multiplying the 
weighted market share of the particular efficient product with its relative energy consump-
tion compared to a corresponding inefficient product, the share of efficient products in en-
ergy consumption is determined for each Member State as well as for EU27.   
Market shares in value terms 
For our modelling purposes, we need market shares to be in value terms. However, sources 
only have market shares by volume. Consequently, we have to take these and adjust for the 
price effect. Information for the price adjustment:  
 
Information for the price adjustment consists of price data and data on market shares by 
volume and is mainly found in the following sources: 
 
  Prices: European Commission (DG TAXUD) (2008), IVM (2008), Kemna et.al. 
(2007), and www.bycentral.co.uk 
  Market shares by volume: Bertoldi, P. & Atanasiu, B., (2007), Kemna et.al. (2007) 
 
The adjustment itself takes place in the following way:  
The market share of a certain appliance of a certain energy class is multiplied with its stated 
price (e.g. 4% A+ refrigerators in Austria multiplied by the EU-15 price for an A+ refrigera-
tor (534€) = 22). Thereafter, the weighted value for efficient goods is obtained by adding to-
gether the market shares value for the appliances marked A or better (and vice versa for the 
appliances marked B or worse to obtain the weighted value for inefficient products). 
                                                           
44 The missing values for Denmark and Finland are assumed to equal the values for Sweden, missing values for Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia are assumed to equal the values for Poland, missing values for Greece 
and Cyprus are assumed to equal the values for Italy, missing values for Luxembourg and the Netherlands are as-
sumed to equal the values for Belgium, missing values for Ireland are assumed to equal the values for the UK, miss-
ing values for Malta are assumed to equal the values for Portugal and the values missing for Romania are assumed to 




For freezers we only have the price data for A++ down to B-labelled appliances. We thus as-
sume that the price for all appliances labelled C or worse is the same as for the ones labelled 
B. 
 
Due to lack of price data for freezers, dishwashers and ovens for the Eastern EU countries we 
approximate these prices using the weighted average of variation in Western EU/Eastern EU 
prices that we have for refrigerators and washing machines. The weighted average of varia-
tion is +44.6% for refrigerators and +43.34% for washing machines. By taking an arithmetic 
average we get a weighted average variation of 44%. We use this when estimating the prices 
for the Eastern EU countries (NMS-12) (e.g. to get the price of a certain appliance of a cer-
tain efficiency class in Eastern EU we divide the Western EU price by the factor 1,44.). 
Weighing together household appliances to an aggregate share efficient/inefficient 
For SE, UK, BE, NL, IT, DE, AT, FR, ES and PT the weights are based on the sales of ma-
jor domestic appliances (refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, dishwashers, tumble dri-
ers, ovens, cookers and hobs) in 2005. Due to the absence of data the same weights have 
been applied to DNK, GRC, IRL, FIN and LUX., in other words the same weights have 
been given to all EU-15 countries. For the remaining countries (the NMS-12) weights are 







   
Table 0.2 Selected studies of experiments with promoting household energy efficiency using non-VAT instruments 
Product st. energy efficiency 
requirements 
Alternative promotion instruments to 
VAT (subsidies)  
Motivation (goals)  Description of the scheme (target group / 
duration) 
Evaluation (reference)  Effects (what happened actually) 
Electrical appliances  Temporary subsidy to purchase energy efficient 
appliances (1999-2005) , Denmark  
Promote A (1999), A+ (2004) and A++ (2005) 
appliances 
Information campaign (best efficiency and best 
price websites) and temporary purchase subsidy 
to consumers,  
Evaluation published in 2007 
http://www.eceee.org/conference_proceedings
/eceee/2007/Panel_1/1.345/ 
A, A+ and A++ displaced C, D, E as dominant 
models. Prices of the A-class dropped signifi-
cantly 
Washing machines  Energy Efficiency Commitment, UK  Renew stock of washing machines  Subsidies to purchase of washing machines   Bertoldi & Atanasiu (2006): Electricity consump-
tion in Europe  
Subsidisation of 0.8 million washing machines 
B-class almost disappeared from the market, 
but also increase of non-labbelled appliances 
Freezers  Utility-sponsored subsidy: (Denmark, 1990-1991) Replace 1000 freezers with energy efficient 
models among the stock owned by utility cus-
tomers 
ECU 2,7 granted for each year the old appliance 
exceed 10 years. Average subsidy was 57 ECU or 
15% of price of new energy efficient appliance 




1400 freezers replaced, but 50% of participants 
are free riders, negative NPV of measure, distri-
butional effects positive, Campaign had slight 
socioeconomic loss.  
Air conditioners  Rebate program from 1994  Replace low efficiency purchases with high effi-
ciency (central air conditioning) 
6202 rebates given out for efficient central air 
conditioner by a utility to its customers. 
Evaluation published 2002 
http://www.eceee.org/conference_proceedings
/ACEEE_buildings/2002/Panel_8/p8_21/ 
5% of participants adopted central air condi-
tioning only because of the program – subsidies 
may encourage additional use and contribute to 
more energy use.  
Consumer electronics (digital to 
analogue set-top boxes 
Subsidies   Energy efficient set top boxes  Subsidies amounting to $1.5 billion are to be 
granted to purchase digital to analogue set top 
boxes. The body overlooking the subsidy is to 
draft energy efficiency standards for set top 
boxes 
http://www.edn.com/article/CA6337591.html  To be determined  
Light bulbs  Subsidy to sale energy efficient light bulbs be-
low cost, New Zealand 
 
Various in-store informational and promotional 
campaigns  





Promote efficient lighting  















No review available  
Non-electric boilers   Subsidies to efficient boilers, introduced 1991 
(stopped in 1996) 
Promote more expensive more efficient boiler 
(new technology in late 80s),  
f 350 per boiler in 1993 granted in cash to 
households if boiler meets efficiency criteria 




320 thousand boilers subsidised 
Expected that sale of boilers increased 
Share of smaller efficient boilers grew. No data 
on free riding. Positive employment effects dur-
ing the duration of experiment and permanent 
thereafter. 
Stopped when no more support w 
as needed, in 1996. 
Organic  foodstuffs       
Housing  Heating audit scheme, Denmark  Develop specific recommendations on improv-
ing the efficiency of a residential heating sys-
tem 
Residential houses, 5000 heating audits per 
year 
Evaluation published in 1995 
http://www.eceee.org/conference_proceedings
/eceee/1995/Panel_2/p2_6/ 
3 recommendations per house (insulation, 
thermostats). 25% of proposed projects have 
been carried out within 3 years. Low economic 
value - improvements would have been carried 
out anyway. 
Housing – cavity insulation and 
overall energy efficiency  
Alternative tax instruments to reduced VAT on 
insulation or holistic programs targeting energy 
efficiency in housing. 
Contractor installed insulation currently has re-
duced VAT of 5% in the UK. But of little benefit 
in DIY and subsidization contexts  
Are holistic approaches better? (theoretical 
study) 
Currently, there is reduced VAT on insulation, 
heat pumps, solar panels, etc. Consumers not 
aware and do not benefit. Analysis of alterna-





Incentives for installing insulation in housing 
linked to council taxes or stamp duties are the 
most promising measures identified (quicker 
impact and less distortions).  
  
Source Copenhagen Economics:     [Dobbeltklik her og skriv kundens navn ]    
Table 0.3 Substitution elasticities 
Product  Subst.elasticity  Study 
Leisure (vs. Goods)  0,77  Bovenberg and Goulder (1996)  
Energy goods (vs. Non-energy)  0,8  Conrad and Löschel (2005) 
Household appliances  1  Donnelly et al (2004)  
Consumer electronics  1  Donnelly et al (2004) 
Boilers  1  Donnelly et al (2004) 
Food  1  Donnelly et al (2004) 
Energy eff. HA  3    
Energy eff. CE  3    
Energy eff. Boilers  3   
Organic food  -5,4-24,7  Hansen (2008), de Haan (2001) 
Source: Copenhagen Economics  
 
 
There are relatively few studies which estimate the relevant substitution elasticities for energy 
goods and energy efficient variants of household appliances, consumer electronics and boil-
ers. We have chosen the estimates which we believe have the highest quality and are most 
appropriate for the CGE model used in this study. The criteria for assessing the quality of 
the estimates are first of all whether they constitute a professional standard – that is, a choice 
of substitution elasticity should be relatively non-controversial in comparison with other re-
search. Second, the estimates should be based on econometric methods – that is, a choice of 
substitution elasticity should be backed by high quality econometric evidence. 
 
The estimated substitution elasticity between energy goods and non-energy goods comes 
from Conrad and Löschel (2005). This paper is relatively well published in the scientific 
journal Applied Economics, and hence the choice of substitution elasticity of 0.8 cannot be 
considered controversial. Sorrell et al. (2008) is a recent survey of rebound effects of techno-
logical progress, which presents a range of substitution elasticities between energy goods and 
non-energy goods used in the literature. The full range of substitution elasticities used in the 
studies reviewed is 0.07 to 1. Allan et al. (2006) performs CGE model based analysis of re-
bound effects and uses a range of substitution elasticities of 0.1 to 0.7 with 0.3 as the base-
line.  
 
There is an issue concerning the transferability of the substitution elasticity estimates from 
previous studies to this study. Previous studies considered substitution between energy and 
non-energy goods in production, whereas we consider the substitution in consumption. We 
can defend this to some extent by referring to the fact that consumers are in a sense also pro-
ducers in our model, as they demand the same goods as industry does, though in different 
magnitudes. However, it remains a different issue whether the practise from other lines of re-
search are fully transferable – but we have found no evidence that gives us a strong justifica-
tion for deviating from the practise in the other line of research. 
 
Thus, there appears to be consensus that the substitution elasticity between energy and non-
energy goods is between 0 and 1, but no econometric evidence exists to inform the choice   Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products 
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within this range. We have chosen 0.8 because it is in line with accepted scientific practise in 
relatively comparable research, and we perform sensitivity analysis which is presented in the 
report. 
 
Regarding the substitution elasticity between energy efficient and conventional variants of 
household appliances, consumer electronics and boilers, we have found no econometric evi-
dence to support the choice of parameter, and we have found no other CGE model compa-
rable to ours. Hence, the choice of substitution elasticity is based on substitution elasticities 
for comparable energy using goods, c.f. Donnelly et al. (2004) which state substitution elas-
ticities around 3 for electronic equipment for use in the USITC trade model. We therefore 
choose substitution elasticities of 3 for household appliances, consumer electronics and boil-
ers. We also perform sensitivity analyses for these choices. 
 